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ABSTRACT 
 The Maoist insurgency of Nepal, which lasted from 1996 to 2006, was a major 
communist armed insurrection that cost more than 13,000 lives and brought a significant 
change to Nepal’s historical political structure. This insurgency ended after the Maoists 
entered the mainstream politics of the country in 2006, but questions remain on why they 
decided to join democratic politics. Understanding this outcome is important because it 
provides insights into how insurgencies are resolved. Using a qualitative method, this 
thesis analyzes the roles of Nepal’s domestic political parties, its monarch, and the 
international community in bringing the Maoist into mainstream politics. This 
investigation reveals that as a result of the changing domestic and international political 
scenario surrounding the insurgency, Maoists were forced to modify their strategy and 
join mainstream politics. Nepal’s Maoist insurgency reveals the importance of pursuing a 
counterinsurgency approach that combines political and military measures, rather than 
excessive use of force that benefits the rebels as demonstrated in the earlier period of the 
insurrection. The state’s acknowledgement of the Maoists’ agendas and its willingness to 
engage in power sharing and constitutional amendment were keys that guided the 
insurgents toward mainstream politics. 
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The Maoist insurgency of Nepal from 1996 to 2006 cost the lives of more than 
13,000 people and attempted to turn the country into a communist state. This armed 
struggle, which ended in a political compromise, only partially succeeded in achieving its 
objectives. Although it did not transform Nepal into a communist state, the insurgency did 
serve as the catalyst that led to the abolishment of the monarchy, the eradication of 
feudalism in Nepal, and the inclusion of marginalized people, who comprised a majority 
of the population, into Nepal’s democratic political process. Moreover, the peaceful end to 
the conflict also enabled the conversion of the insurgents into a legitimate political party 
for participation in Nepal’s political sphere. This thesis explains why the Maoists decided 
to abandon a decade-long violent insurgency in favor of joining mainstream politics to 
advance their agenda. This research highlights various aspects of the insurgency and the 
state and the external response to the insurgency, and analyzes the methods of peaceful 
solution of an insurgency.  
In exploring the Nepalese Maoist insurgency as a single case study, this thesis 
analyzes scholarly research on insurgencies and conflict resolution in general, as well as 
academic, government, and media reports on the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in particular. 
Using a qualitative method based on secondary sources such as books, scholarly articles, 
journals, and official documents, this thesis examines the insurgency in the context of 
changing domestic and international politics, ideological rifts within the Maoist movement 
as well the pivot in its strategies, and the government response to the insurgency. The 
analysis also considers maneuvers by the palace to secure political power and the activities 
of Nepal’s political parties against this backdrop. Finally, it assesses the role of external 
actors and influences on the outcome of the insurgency. Among the factors that contributed 
to the Maoists’ eventual entry into mainstream politics were the Maoists’ willingness to 
adopt a modified strategy, encouragement from legitimate domestic political parties 
banned by King Gyanendra, and the international community’s active assistance. The intra-
party ideological conflicts also contributed to the Maoists abandoning the armed 
insurgency and engaging in national politics. 
xii 
The analysis finds that the state’s initial response to the insurgency was 
counterproductive. Government suppression of the Maoists resulted in massive 
destruction, death, rape, and numerous arrests of the local population, which pushed people 
even further into the Maoist fold. Moreover, the successive governments in the 1990s did 
not attempt to identify or address the deep-rooted causes of the insurgency and instead 
adopted insufficient short-term policies to counter the uprising. Although it did not address 
the root causes of the insurgency, the government maintained its determination to bring the 
Maoists to the negotiating table, and after a series of efforts, it succeeded in doing so. That 
first step helped the Maoists to enter into mainstream politics. Within the political arena, 
the new government of Nepal eventually accepted the main demands of the Maoists. After 
restructuring Nepal as a republic, the new government abolished the monarchy, guaranteed 
the proper representation of the marginalized community, and created the conditions for 
the Maoists to join national politics.  
In addition, findings from the analysis show that the support of international 
communist organizations, especially in India, were ideologically crucial in driving the 
Maoists toward more hostile activities, and Indian territory was a sanctuary for their 
training and operational planning. At the same time, the support of India and the United 
States, along with other countries, for Nepal’s government efforts to counter the insurgency 
were also significant. The identification of the Maoist insurgents as a terrorist group 
following the 9/11 attacks on the United States left the group with few options for 
international support, and coupled with violence that often impacted the general population 
of Nepal, put pressure on the Maoists to seek a political solution to the conflict. Ultimately, 
these factors led to the peace agreements that brought the Maoists from violence into to the 
peaceful political mainstream. 
The Maoist insurgency presents valuable lessons that can help government leaders 
of developing states facing social, political, and economic challenges similar to those of 
Nepal to politically and effectively counter insurgent movements and offer a path to 
peacefully settle ongoing or possible future insurgencies. For Nepal, in particular, these 
lessons can help the government formulate future policies to prevent or avert a potential 
insurgency by the Maoist splinter group led by Biplov. Nepal needs to establish a clear and 
xiii 
effective strategy while the insurgent group remains relatively small and before it can gain 
traction. Because, as this analysis illustrated, once an insurgency has erupted, the state is 
more likely to engage militarily, which can be counterproductive. Nepal should be careful 
to use proportional force that will not escalate the conflict. The Biplov faction must be 
dealt with politically to prevent any further escalation of the conflict. The issues raised by 
Biplov can be incorporated into the political process, where those Maoists can find a way 
to achieve their objectives peacefully. Internationally, Nepal should maintain harmonious 
relations with Indian authorities and concentrate on not allowing the Biplov group to use 
Indian territory as their sanctuary, a move that can deter them from waging armed conflict. 
Additionally, Nepal must make sure that India does not have incentives to side with the 
Biplov and leverage that relationship against the government of Nepal. 
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The Maoist insurgency, which began in February 1996 and lasted until November 
2006, was the deadliest internal armed conflict in the modern history of Nepal. The conflict 
lasted for a decade, cost the lives of more than 13,000 people, and changed the political 
system of Nepal, helping to oust the monarchy in May 2008 and establish the federal 
republic of Nepal. These events represented a significant shift in the democratic 
consolidation of Nepal. Although it was a communist revolutionary movement, the 
insurgency was the catalyst that led to the eradication feudalism in Nepal and brought 
marginalized people into Nepal’s democratic political process. 
The causes of this insurgency were complex and wide-ranging. The underlying 
causes of the insurgency included poverty, political instability, ethnic discrimination and 
marginalization, and the unequal distribution of natural resources.1 At the onset of the 
insurgency, the Maoists wanted to abolish the monarchy and challenge the democratic 
parties, but after a long and violent struggle, the Maoists surrendered their arms in 2008. 
The insurgency’s end was secured by a 12-point agreement and the historical 
Comprehensive Peace Accord of 2006 between the Maoists and the interim government of 
Nepal. It was also a landmark for the Maoists’ entry into mainstream politics. Since then, 
Maoists have ruled Nepal and shared political power through electoral victories. 
The leaders of the Maoist Party frequently state that they did not abandon their 
agenda but merely used a different approach to achieve their goals using established 
political means.2 Nevertheless, it remains unclear why, after a bloody ten-year conflict, a 
majority of the Maoists decided to drastically change their strategy and join the existing 
political system rather than pursue a Maoist state framework. The political participation of 
the former insurgents in the democratic institutions has raised questions, not only among 
central cadres of the Maoist party who still have doubts about why they joined politics but 
 
1 Adam Lockyer, “Civil War and Insurgency in Asia,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter 
Terrorism 13, no. 2 (May 4, 2018): 142–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1478115. 
2 Aditya Adhikari, “Nepal: The Discontents after the Revolution,” Economic and Political Weekly 48, 
no. 7 (2013): 27–29, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23391302. 
2 
also among other political leaders who seek to implement economic and social policy.3 
Additionally, this inquiry serves as the focus of this research.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The thesis aims to answer the following research question: Why did the Maoist 
insurgents join mainstream politics in Nepal? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
Today, Nepal still has several sources of insecurity such as poverty, inequality, and 
injustice that make the country vulnerable to insurgencies. A new hardline splinter group 
of the former Maoist insurgents in Nepal, now led by Netra Bikram Chand “Biplov,” claims 
to be reinitiating the armed insurgency. This group blames the former Maoists for 
corruption and abandoning the communist ideology and objectives by joining mainstream 
politics.4 This research assesses the successes and failures of Nepal’s experience with the 
decade-long Maoist insurgency that ended in 2006 so that the country can learn from its 
failures and formulate future policies based on the subsequent successes to counter a 
possible future insurgency. 
In addition, the case of the Maoists in Nepal offers a model of political resolution 
for other states facing insurgencies. Since many insurgencies around the globe, such as the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army 
(FARC) in Colombia, are engaged in the process of peace deals and negotiations with state 
governments, the example of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal provides a framework for 
political settlement of insurgency for the international community. In the realm of theory, 
this thesis contributes to the literature on how insurgencies end in order to combat 





C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Determining why the Maoists ended their insurgency and joined mainstream 
politics requires an understanding of how insurgencies emerge as well as how and why 
they end. This literature review analyzes the scholarly debates related to the approaches to 
ending insurgencies. It mainly focuses on the measures that provide an opportunity to the 
insurgent groups to change their course of action and participate in mainstream politics. 
This research also highlights the factors that trigger insurgencies. It explores the relevant 
internal political dynamics and prevalent socio-economic conditions, investigates the 
factors that mobilize people to join an insurgency, and analyzes the reasons behind former 
insurgents’ participation in mainstream politics. 
Before turning to the literature, it is useful to define what an insurgency is. Scholars 
offer various definitions of insurgency but broadly agree that it is an extended “political 
and military” struggle aimed at replacing the existing government and controlling the 
population, resources, and territories.5 Bard O’Neill defines insurgency as “a struggle 
between non-ruling groups and ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group 
consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and 
demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of 
one or more aspects of politics.”6 According to William H. Miller, there are two primary 
models of insurgencies: urban insurrection and rural guerrilla warfare. Urban insurrection 
is mainly focused on the rapid capture of power from the elites in major population centers, 
whereas rural guerrilla warfare, as framed by Mao, focuses on using the general population 
to challenge the central government at its weakest point.7 Based on these definitions, the 
next section recounts the scholarly explanations for what causes insurgencies and what 
factors lead insurgencies to reach an end. 
 
5 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc, 2005), chaps. 
1–2. 
6 O’Neill, 15. 
7 William H. Miller, “Insurgency Theory and the Conflict in Algeria: A Theoretical Analysis,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2000): 60–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09546550008427550. 
4 
1. How Insurgencies Start 
Scholars identify various reasons for the emergence of insurgencies. To understand 
the nature of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, we must understand the framework presented 
by the theories regarding the origins of insurgencies. Depending on the geography and 
structure of the nation, there might be several reasons causing insurgencies to arise. 
Existing theories mainly point to social, political, and economic reasons for the rise of 
insurgencies; this review assesses those that help to understand the context of the Maoist 
insurgency in Nepal. 
Some scholars suggest that social causes are at the root of insurgencies. Jonathan 
Joseph, a proponent of social theory, argues that every society has different interests and 
also has uncertainty, diversity, and fragmentation as major components.8 He asserts that 
society itself generates conflict since it is composed of diverse groups that are not well 
integrated and not well integrated, which creates social disorder, making a state vulnerable 
to insurgencies. Similarly, William Niskanen believes that “political, economic, and social 
conditions” play an essential role and that the population is critical in the insurgency.9 
According to Kevin Quinn, caste and ethnicity can be another leading cause of an 
insurgency.10 As Sharma points out, the dominance of a minority over the majority of a 
population can bring rivalry and can lead to the eruption of insurgency.11 Developing 
countries, in particular, tend to be more prone to insurgencies due to factors such as the 
exclusion of lower castes from state resources, as Deptima Shukla notes, and from the 
mainstream of society and governmental services.12 In a broad sense, Fearonand Laitin 
 
8 Jonathan Joseph, “Introduction: The Norms of Sociology,” in Social Theory:Conflict, Cohesion and 
Consent (Edinberg, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 1–5, https://doi.org/10.3366/j.ctvxcrx3c.4. 
9 William A. Niskanen, “The Economics of Insurgency,” ed. Nathan Leites, Charles Wolf, and Robert 
Sansom, Public Choice 9 (1970): 85–92, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30022625. 
10 Kevin Quinn, Michael Hechter, and Erik Wibbels, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War 
Revisited,” Paper Presented at the 7th Meeting of the Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes, Yale 
University, New Haven, CT, May 9−11, 2003. 
11 Sourabh Jyoti Sharma, “Ethnicity And Insurgency In Myanmar: Profiling of Non-State Insurgent 
Groups,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 18, no. 3 (2014): 150–68, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/48505114. 
12 Deeptima Shukla, “Insurgency in Nepal and Role of State,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 
64, no. 1/2 (2003): 66, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41855770. 
5 
alleges that countries experience insurgencies due to conditions of state weakness, poverty, 
large populations, and social instability.13 It is important to note that these authors do not 
blame a single variable for the emergence of conflict. 
Similarly, some scholars believe that insurgencies are caused by political forces. 
According to Smruti Pattanaik, another crucial factor behind the rise of insurgency is 
political instability that affects the development and stability of governments.14 Indeed, as 
Manas Chatterjee and B. M. Jain posit, rapid changes in governments and elected officials 
mishandling of domestic problems can destablize the political structure in any nation.15 
Following this line of thought, Nabiha Gul notes that insurgencies in such countries might 
arise as repercussions of instability in the government.16 Similarly, the human needs theory 
explains that every citizen has basic needs and the state has to provide those needs through 
the proper policy measures. If the state fails to fulfill its citizens’ basic needs, the 
population tends to threaten the existing system through violent resistance or may join 
insurgencies.17 
Yet, some other scholars point to economic issues as the source of grievances 
driving insurgencies. Along this line, Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, the 
discontent theorists, posit that rapid population growth and the unequal distribution of land 
fuels the emergence of insurgencies.18 Likewise, Muller, a relative deprivation theorist, 
claims that when people find prevailing conditions intolerable, they tend to harbor anti-
 
13 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American 
Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222. 
14 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Examining Socio‐economic Grievances and 
Political Implications,” Strategic Analysis 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 118–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09700160208450028. 
15 Manas Chatterji and B. M. Jain, Conflict and Peace in South Asia: Conflict and Peace in South Asia 
(Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2008), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=453246. 
16 Nabiha Gul, “Question of Nepal: Political Instability and Maoist Insurgency,” Pakistan Horizon 55, 
no. 3 (2002): 27–40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41394409. 
17 Gulshan Majjeed, “Human Needs Theory: A Significant Approach to Manage Ethnic Conflicts in 
Pakistan - ProQuest,” Journal of Political Studies 24, no. 1 (2017): 1–17, http://search.proquest.com/
docview/1927102264?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo. 
18 Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Inequality and Insurgency,” The American Political 
Science Review 81, no. 2 (1987): 425–51, https://doi.org/10.2307/1961960. 
6 
government sentiments and develop a greater willingness to take part in aggressive 
activities that might lead to insurgencies.19 Mahendra Lawoti and Anup Kumar Pahari 
argue that economic inequality and poverty are the key elements that contribute to the 
initiation and growth of insurgencies.20 In their view, a lack of economic development and 
sustainable growth provides fertile ground for the discontented citizen to engage in 
insurgencies and seek alternatives to the current government. Likewise, in Quy-Toan Do 
and Lakshmi Iyer’s view, developing countries with economic stagnation and deprivation 
create a higher volume of grievances against the state and therefore are more prone to 
conflict.21 
There are various causes for the emergence of insurgencies, and each insurgency 
unfolds according to a country’s social, political, and economic system. The strength of the 
government to deal with the prevalent domestic issues determines whether an insurgency 
emerges or not. As analyzed earlier, insurgencies are often a political phenomenon as was 
the Maoists’ insurgency in Nepal.  
2. How Insurgencies End 
Scholars recommend various methods to counter and end insurgencies. Since this 
issue is core to the thesis question, it is essential to look at the explanations for how and 
why insurgencies end in response to specific government-directed measures; this could 
help us to understand better how the Maoist insurgency in Nepal came to an end and how 
the Maoists joined mainstream politics. Based on the explanations provided by scholars, 
there are two primary approaches to ending insurgenciesmilitary and political. 
Government actions, operations, and counterinsurgency measures are classified in the 
military category, whereas negotiation, diplomacy, agreement, and peace deals fall in the 
political category. In some cases, scholars have proposed combining the two categories of 
 
19 Edward N. Muller, “Frustration-Aggression Theory,” in Aggressive Political Participation 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 121–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt13x14rb.8. 
20 Mahendra Lawoti and Anup Kumar Pahari, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the 
Twenty-First Century (London, UK: Routledge, 2009), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203869390. 
21 Quy-Toan Do and Lakshmi Iyer, “Geography, Poverty and Conflict in Nepal,” Journal of Peace 
Research 47, no. 6 (November 1, 2010): 735–48, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310386175. 
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approaches to address insurgency. This combined method applies the military and political 
measures simultaneously along with the involvement of national and international actors. 
The combined method has proved to be useful in countering and ending insurgencies. 
In a framework similar to the combined method, Russel Croy provides “Logistic” 
and “Military Centric” explanations for ending an insurgency. Those two explanations 
have five significant variables: internal and external political support, lack of organization, 
conflict duration, death of an insurgent leader, and formal military intervention to resolve 
an insurgency.22 Croy also claims that security scholars have failed to offer any 
generalizable theories on ending the insurgency. Bard E. O’Neill also argues that an 
insurgency is a political and military phenomenon that can be defeated if a “competent and 
capable government administration dispenses services...and effectively co-ordinates a 
multitude of political, economic, and security policies.”23 
In addition, some scholars have sought to define a solution to insurgency through a 
broader approach, arguing that an insurgency is primarily a political problem. Scholars like 
Bhuwan Chandra Upreti believe that insurgencies tend to take advantage of political 
opportunity if provided with proper legitimacy. According to him, the agreement, peace 
deal, and various layers of negotiation are the components of this approach. Upreti has 
highlighted the importance of a political solution to insurgency and its fruitful outcome in 
his book Maoists in Nepal.24 Likewise, Alexandra Phelan claims that the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia−People’s Army (FARC) conflict in Colombia was resolved 
through a peace agreement that allowed the insurgent group to participate in politics and 
society after the Colombian government addressed the group’s grievances through a 
specific mechanism.25 
 
22 Russell Croy, “How Do Insurgencies End,” Small War Journal, October 11, 2014, 
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(Delhi, India: Kalpaz Publications, 2008), chap. 7. 
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The state plays a significant role in dealing with the underlying issues of 
insurgencies. To put it differently, the success or failure of an insurgency depends on the 
democratic strength of a state. A study by Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki claim that 
pseudo-democracies do not succeed against armed insurgent conflict.26 This study further 
argues that if an insurgency stems from persistent underlying causes, and the government 
is weak, the chances are high that the insurgency will win. The research further claims that 
insurgencies can end in one of four ways.27 First, an insurgency may end when a 
government is overthrown, a territory annexed, or minority rights are recognized. Second, 
governments achieve a victory over insurgencies by destroying or using political channels 
to end them. Third, some insurgencies can be ended through negotiated settlements. The 
last type of ending is inconclusive, meaning the insurgency continues for but at a lower 
level of hostility or is dormant, which cannot be detected until it re-emerges. 
Based on the various analyses and scholarly explanations, it is possible to conclude 
the following are some of the methods that might help to bring an end to an insurgency. 
The first method is to employ military power and tactical operations. Most insurgencies 
early in their existence meet with government forces on the battlefield and face subsequent 
defeat. Spyridon Plakoudas argues that the state has military superiority over insurgents in 
most cases.28 In this case, Connable and Libicki also support that military measures are 
one of the main tools to bring insurgencies to an end and highlight the use of such means 
that garnered significant defeats of insurgent movements in world history.29 According to 
them, victory can be partial or complete depending on whether one of the warring parties 
attains only some or all of its objectives. Also, the victory can be either temporary or 
sufficient, depending on the type of insurgency.30 David Brewster, in the Journal of the 
Indian Ocean Region, states that the destruction of the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of 
 
26 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), xiv, 
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27 Connable and Libicki, 13–20. 
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Tamil Eelam (LLTE) in 2009 was a well-organized military solution that had no post-
conflict violence, an example of a sufficient solution for other nations to end insurgencies 
and bring peace.31 
At the same time, another set of scholars advocate political methods to address 
insurgencies, pointing to negotiation as a peaceful solution to an insurgency. Plakaudas 
argues that the opinion of the population is a decisive factor in an insurgency as those 
armed conflicts are not shaped by military actions, but by the population’s desire for 
“social, economic, and political change.”32 Audrey Kurth Cronin, in How Terrorism Ends, 
agrees that negotiation is a critical tool to end terrorism as it leads to a gradual demise of 
terrorist violence while other measures bring an end only to the terror.33 According to 
Cronin, insurgencies are terrorist activities, and they need to be handled with caution, 
making negotiation the most effective tool to end the insurgency. She claims that conflict 
cannot be ended through military measures. Similarly, Connable and Libicki support the 
use of negotiation, as results of their analysis indicates that one-third of modern civil wars 
have concluded through negotiation.34 John Newsinger reinforces this view, point to the 
Irish Republican Movement in the United Kingdom that was settled through negotiation 
and subsequent political power-sharing.35 The British were able to settle the conflict 
through negotiation and succeeded in disarming the insurgents and establishing 
constitutional reforms that addressed the IRA’s grievances.36 A robust and well-planned 
negotiation can thus bring terrorism and insurgency to a peaceful settlement. 
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On the other hand, Edwin Bakker offers a holistic and comprehensive approach to 
end an insurgency in his book Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies. Bakker defines 
the holistic approach as a wide range of approaches, including preventive, repressive, soft, 
and hard measures. He argues that this multifaceted method can de-radicalize insurgents.37 
Bakker acknowledges, though, such a whole-of-government approach is costly and 
challenging to implement. He does not, however, offer evidence of how this method might 
motivate insurgents to join in the political sphere after the conflict has ended. 
Scholars have subsequently highlighted the importance of international players in 
either sustaining or ending insurgencies. A study of insurgencies in modern times shows 
that they do not limit themselves to a specific territory. Christiantus Oke notes that it might 
be challenging to defeat insurgencies if they have trans-border links for cooperation, 
logistics and arms supplies, training, and fundraising.38 The worldwide campaign of “The 
War on Terror” against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda gives a picture 
of the transnational organizational structure of insurgencies. As Rabindra Mishra posits, 
the geographical situation and security interests related to these insurgent movements invite 
international actors to play roles in insurgencies.39 In Daniel Bayman’s view, immigrants 
overseas tend to support the insurgencies in their homelands, and external actors seek to 
have some control over an insurgency if they have provided political, economic, and 
logistical support to the insurgency.40 By contrast, Connable and Libicki mention “the 
need for external support to the government at some point along the conflict timeline” to 
conclude the insurgency.41 At the same time, they confirm that insurgents also need some 
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kind of external sanctuary and support to survive and succeed. Thus, there is 
multidimensional evidence for the need of external support either to sustain an insurgency 
or to bring an end to it. The expansion of insurgencies into the global arena ideally demands 
the involvement of international actors to play their role to end the insurgency. Various 
diplomatic negotiations, agreements, and legal and economic sanctions can help in 
concluding such conflicts. 
In light of the literature reviewed, it can be concluded that insurgencies tend to 
survive until the affected state addresses the conflict’s root causes. As Thomas Mockaitis 
argues, “government can win if it can address the root causes of social and economic unrest 
on which the insurgency feeds, “42 it is the government that has to address the underlying 
grievances and set up an effective mechanism to deal with them. Since most insurgencies 
are politically motivated, governments can best deal with them through a political 
approach. Based on the analysis of the various methods just described as they relate to the 
Maoist insurgency in Nepal, a combined holistic approach, along with international 
support, most likely led the insurgents engaging in mainstream of politics at the end of the 
insurgency. The ideas and measures inherent in the holistic approach seem most helpful to 
understand the Maoist insurgency because they emphasize the effort of a combined 
approach to address the conflict’s root causes. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Various factors shaped the Maoists’ journey from an armed struggle to their 
participation in the democratic political sphere after the declaration of the Republic of 
Nepal in 2008. Although there are numerous explanations for the Maoists’ turn to 
mainstream politics, this thesis focuses on two variables that played a significant role in 
ending the group’s insurgency and making their political participation possible: 
• H1: The turbulent domestic political situation, including the Maoists’ well 
planned strategy, the government’s weak counterinsurgency measures, the 
Maoists’ internal conflict, and ensuing peace agreements, created an 
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opportunity and the necessity for the Maoists to change course and 
brought them into the mainstream political sphere. 
The Maoists’ decision to join mainstream politics took place amid numerous 
political upheavals in Nepal. Once the insurgency started in 1996, the political system of 
Nepal began to crumble, and the inability of the political parties coupled with weak 
democratic practices eroded the security situation, providing a space for the palace to 
intervene in the politics. After the Maoists’ attack on the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), the 
king initiated his move into national politics seeking executive power in 2001, and in 2005, 
the king finally took the power into his hands and banned all the political parties in the 
country. This royal takeover of Nepal’s government changed Nepal’s political structure 
and brought the Nepalese political parties and Maoists into one camp to fight against the 
monarchy. During this period, a political opening emerged for the Maoists. Similarly, the 
Maoists adopted the democratic multiparty system and agreed to join hands with other 
political parties. The shift in the extreme Maoist agenda “from a revolutionary ... to a 
democratic one”43 became apparent after the two groups agreed to an alliance. This thesis 
assesses the actions of the monarchy, the changed status of the political parties, and the 
power-sharing agreements between Maoists and other parties in the post-2005 period. 
• H2: Post-9/11 international pressure forced the Maoists to adopt a more 
political, less violent approach. 
Another possible explanation for the Maoists’ laying down their arms and joining 
the political sphere is the international support provided to the government of Nepal during 
the post-9/11 global “War on Terror.” The increasing military capabilities of government 
forces and the deteriorating condition of the insurgency further explain the political journey 
of the Maoists in Nepal, as these conditions forced the Maoists to acknowledge that they 
were not capable of overrunning the state. Moreover, pressure from the international 
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community, especially from India, convinced Nepal’s other parties to include the Maoists 
in the political sphere. This thesis also tests this hypothesis. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis adopts the single case-study method to analyze successful conflict 
resolution as illustrated in the Nepalese context and the political journey of Nepal’s Maoist 
insurgents. Framed by the literature related to ending insurgencies, this research analyzes 
the political conditions over the course of the insurgency through the study of statements 
and documents of the political parties of Nepal and the Maoists. It also considers the impact 
of diplomatic pressure, and examines news, official reports, and political parties’ 
agreements with the Maoists to fight jointly against monarchial rule. 
Then, to analyze the effect of international pressure on Maoists, this thesis assesses 
the international sanctions and bans on the Maoists’ activities, including the international 
community’s labeling of the Maoists as a terrorist group, international assistance to the 
government of Nepal as military aid, and diplomatic pressure on the Maoists to lay down 
their weapons. The Maoist response to international pressure, as well as scholarly literature 
on external support, government reports, and materials gathered by journalists are assessed 
in detail. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains five chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter II 
elaborates briefly on the political history of Nepal, focusing specifically on its 
democratization and communist movements. The chapter also identifies the major splits 
and factions within the communist party throughout the king’s rule, their political relations 
with other parties, and the expansion of extremism within the party. The history of 
communism in Nepal from 1950 to the onset of the Maoist insurgency in 1996 is analyzed 
to explore the communist extremism underpinning the insurgency. The rise and trajectory 
of discontent among the political parties after the royal takeover of the Nepalese 
government is also covered in Chapter II. 
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Chapter III tests the hypothesis that the Maoists abandoned the conflict and turned 
to the democratic political sphere primarily due to the opportunities presented by a 
turbulent domestic political scenario, including the chance to pursue their well-planned 
Maoist strategy peacefully, to exploit the government’s weak counterinsurgency measures, 
to avoid further internal conflict within the insurgent movement, and to secure legitimacy 
for their views through participation in peace agreements. Chapter III examines the 
Maoists’ entry into mainstream politics in terms of their cooperation with the existing 
political parties, the coercive counterinsurgency strategy of the monarchy, and the civil 
pressure put on the Maoists, which brought them into negotiation. 
Chapter IV examines the second hypothesis: the role played by international 
support for the government of Nepal and external pressure placed on the Maoists to 
participate in the political arena. 
Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations for future policies and 
strategies that governments can employ to address radical groups and prevent the outbreak 
of insurgencies. 
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II. ORIGINS OF THE MAOISTS—PRIORITIES AND 
CONDITIONS FOR THE INSURGENCY 
To understand why the Nepalese Maoists joined mainstream politics in Nepal after 10 
years of armed insurgency, it is necessary to know who the Maoists are, what the conditions 
were that produced the insurgency, and what their priorities were in waging the insurgency 
based on the history of communism in Nepal after 1950. To that end, this chapter first outlines 
the communist history that brought the Maoists to the forefront of Nepalese politics. This 
section focuses on the important developments and features of communism throughout its 
history in Nepal. The discussion explains the growth of extremism within the Communist 
Party of Nepal—in particular, why a faction of the party longed for armed insurrection. The 
next section examines the prevalent conditions that the Maoists leveraged to gain support for 
their insurgency, which included social, political, ethnic, linguistic, and economic aspects of 
the society. Finally, this chapter examines the political scenario in Nepal after the restoration 
of democracy in 1990 and analyzes the turbulence that prompted the Maoists’ initiation of the 
insurgency, including the policies and strategies of the governments, and their impact on the 
public, which provided the Maoists an opportunity to initiate the insurgency based on political 
discontent. The demands of the Maoists to the then-government and the priorities of the 
Maoists provide a framework to comprehend the insurgency. This chapter then discusses the 
actions and reactions of the Maoists to the exclusionary behavior of the state prior to the 
insurgency. 
In sum, this chapter offers insight into the origins of the Maoists’ insurgency. It 
demonstrates that the Maoist party formed out of the existing Communist Party of Nepal 
(CPN) when the CPN was not able to implement the ideological agenda that it endorsed when 
the party was established. As this chapter describes, the Maoists were radicalized in phases in 
response to the insensitivity of successive governments to the people’s needs, leading them to 
demand the complete eradication of feudal mechanisms and the monarchy itself in order to 
turn the country into a republican state. Ultimately, the insurgency began when the demands 
of the Maoist’ party were not met and the political situation of the country was favorable to 
their cause and objectives. 
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A. THE ORIGINS OF MAOISM IN NEPAL 
The history of communism in Nepal can be divided into three phases of internal 
ideological struggle within the CPN: the establishment phase of the CPN; the conflict among 
party leadership on ideological grounds during the 1980s, when the CPN produced a number 
of splinter groups that adopted hardliner extremism; and the post-1990 democratic phase. The 
Maoist movement in Nepal can be traced back to 1949, when the CPN was established under 
the leadership of Pushpa Lal Shrestha with the assistance of Indian communists.44 As Shukla 
notes, the CPN also joined the Nepali Congress’s insurrection in 1950 to oust the autocratic 
Rana regime that had been in power for 104 years.45 When founded, the CPN—the root 
institution of all the Nepalese communist partiesproclaimed its main objective was to 
establish a “New People’s Democracy,” a model derived from Mao Tse Tung that advocated 
for a political system of proletariats following the core concepts of Marxist and Leninist 
ideologies, i.e., armed revolution and class struggle.46  
In the 1950s, the CPN’s demand for a constitutional election was not honored by the 
king, which created a conflict within the political parties, causing a rift among various groups. 
Instead of allowing elections, the monarch encouraged the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN 
leaders to join the government. This royal action brought a split in the CPN: a faction led by 
Keshar Jung Rayamajhi joined the royal regime, while another faction pursued the ideological 
dream of a republican Nepal. Before this split, in 1958, as Upreti posits, the CPN had vied for 
seats in the local and parliamentary elections but performed poorly.47 Consequently, the 
republican faction of the CPN expanded and formed alliances with groups sharing similar 
ideological views but remained out of power as Nepal remained a kingdom. 
The next important development in the history of the Maoist party was the armed 
uprising of 1971, which laid an important precedent for Maoist insurgency. In April 1971, 
CPN leaders launched an uprising in Jhapa district, which met with harsh measures by the 
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regime, leaving the party leaders and members either killed or jailed.48 As Upreti claims, this 
uprising generated “the seeds of extremist Maoism” in Nepal, and the republican wing of the 
CPN decided to pay more attention to conditions in Nepal to envisage new action plans and 
strategies and to work with the peasant population to strengthen its base.49 In 1978, a CPN 
faction formed the party known as CPN (Marxist-Leninist), or CPN (ML), headed by 
Manmohan Adhikari. This new party, after severe state repression, gave up the aspiration of 
a people’s war against the monarch and followed the political road to socialism, struggling 
for change through a democratic process of mass revolution in coordination with other 
democratic political parties. 
Although the CPN already followed the democratic system, the republican idea was 
later taken up by CPN Masal in 1974.50 The hardliner republican CPN group that supported 
the armed uprising of 1971 organized the fourth convention of the CPN in 1974 under the 
command of Mohan Bikram Singh and Nirmal Lama and re-endorsed the people’s war as a 
future strategy, emerging as a radical wing.51 This group adopted the strategy of “training 
guerrillas, proletarianizing party cadre, creating separate base areas, taking action against local 
cheats, and initiating an agrarian uprising.”52 Ultimately, the group further split on ideological 
grounds such that CPN (Masal) was formed, and again, this Masal group also splintered into 
two groups. In 1984, the Masal group joined the Revolutionary International Movement 
(RIM), a worldwide organization of Maoist parties. In 1989, the other faction of Masal, led 
by Mohan Baidhya, initiated an urban insurrection; many of the group’s leaders got arrested 
and jailed after the government took strict measures to suppress it.53 The party’s central 
committee widely condemned this action of insurrection, and Mohan Baidhya was replaced 
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as general secretary of the party by Pushpa Kamal Dahal “prachanda,” who later became the 
supreme leader of the Maoist Party. 
The 1990s marked a profound change in the political world order following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union that witnessed the rapid growth of democratic transformation. 
Nepal was not untouched by those world affairs, which led to another important change 
among the Maoists. All the communist parties in Nepal also divided along which direction to 
take—one path led to the multiparty system and another path towards the republican agenda. 
In 1990, the communist parties showed a unified face to fight against the Panchayat system. 
As Andrew Nikson argues, “a remarkable ideological unity” was displayed among all the 
communist parties of Nepal, who were pro-Chinese, pro-Soviet, and pro-Maoist, and they 
came together to fight against the monarchial rule.54 When the Nepali Congress (NC) 
leadership led a people’s movement to establish democracy in the country in February 1990, 
the two new communist parties formed of all the communist parties of the Nepal-United Left 
Front (ULF) and the United National People’s Movement (UNPM) were ready to assist the 
democratic movement. The ULF, along with a faction of UNPM-Masal, supported the 
movement, and democracy was re-established in the country on April 8, 1990.55 
Thereafter, a new democratic constitution was promulgated on November 9, 1990, but 
the communist parties’ demands for the election of the constitutional assembly and complete 
abolition of the monarchy were not met. As a result, several radical communist parties then 
merged and formed the CPN Unity Centre (CPN-UC) in November 1990 and Prachanda 
became the general secretary of the party.56 The CPN-UC party demanded the establishment 
of a republican Nepal and rejected the constitution promulgated after 1990. In 1991, the CPN-
UC denounced the parliamentary system under its new ideological framework of “Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism” and relaunched the “People’s War” against the existing political system 
with the Chinese model as its guiding path. In 1994, this party split into two factions, but the 
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election commission of Nepal did not recognize the Prachanda faction, which pushed the party 
to boycott the election and toward more radical politics.57 In 1995, Prachanda named his party 
CPN Maoist (CPN-M) and initiated an armed insurrection against the state of Nepal, which 
was led by a democratic party at the time (the NC).58 The party led various demonstrations 
to raise awareness among the people about the misdeeds of the government, and in response, 
the Maoists faced suppression by the government’s counterinsurgency measures. After two 
years of ideological and organizational growth, the CPN-M party ideologue Baburam 
Bhattarai submitted the party’s 40-point demands on various issues related to national 
development, representation, and livelihood to the government with an ultimatum that the 
government must fulfill them within two weeks or face an armed insurgency.59 (The 40-point 
demands are included in the appendix.) 
B. MAOISTS’ DEMANDS AND THE ROAD TO INSURGENCY 
The CPN-M party submitted its 40-point demands to the government on February 4, 
1996, with a deadline of two weeks.60 Those 40-point demands were a list of grievances under 
the liberal democratic framework, which were previously included in the party’s election 
manifesto of 1991. The demands mostly focused on three key issuesrepresentative 
government, independent economy, and nationalismwhich remain a central debate in the 
county. Those demands were consistent with demands made in 1992, relating to nationalism, 
livelihood, and democracy. The demands included the abrogation of unequal and 
discriminatory treaties between Nepal and India, the promulgation of a new constitution by 
the people’s representatives, land reforms stating that the land must belong to the tenants. The 
land of the feudalists was to be distributed among the landless people. The demands also 
focused on lower caste groups and women. In a way, the Maoists wanted to include all the 
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classes of society in their protracted revolution against the government.61 Overall, the 
demands of the Maoists consisted of policy tools and goals that included 
• Economic issues such as a minimum wage, unemployment compensation, 
low inflation, and infrastructure such as roads, water, and electricity etc.; 
• Ethnic and social issues such as language rights, property rights for 
daughters, corruption control, and an end to caste discrimination; 
• Human rights and media issues such as press autonomy, freedom for 
political detainees; 
• Personal freedom issues such ending enforcement of social conformity and 
cultural policing through restrictions on the individual’s right to enjoy certain 
kinds of music and movies; 
• Governance issues such as the need to establish ideological and institutional 
goals through international negotiations and treaties, constitutional demands; 
and 
• Policy issues related to setting up tools such as macroeconomic policy, 
addressing a closed economy and protectionism, imposing a system of work 
permits for foreign workers, devolution of central authority, ending 
occupational discrimination, etc. Except for the aforementioned 
constitutional demands, many of these issues were raised by other political 
parties and elements of civil society.62 
 
Politically, the Maoists wanted an end of special privileges for the royal family. 
They also wanted to end social and political inequalities, ethnic and caste disparities, and 
discrimination against marginalized groups. In the economic sphere, the Maoists demanded 
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land reforms, and land re-distribution among the landless agricultural population. In regard 
to foreign relations, the call for redefining and abrogating of all the existing unequal treaties 
and halting the recruitment of Nepalese citizens to serve in the foreign military, a demand 
focused on the anti-Indian sentiments among the Nepalese people and India’s frequent 
intrusion into Nepal’s political affairs. 
The issues raised were of grave concern, and they bolstered the rapid expansion of 
Maoist popularity across the country. Rather than address the demands, however, the 
government responded harshly. Finally, the Maoists, who drew support by identifying the 
various shortcomings of the government, declared an insurgency, leading to a decade of 
violence in the country. The Maoists justified the start of the insurgency by pointing to 
government negligence and considered it as one of the prime causes for the initiation of 
the insurgency. The insurgency was officially launched following the Maoists’ armed 
attacks on February 13, 1996.63 
C. CONDITIONS FUELING NEPAL’S MAOIST INSURGENCY 
The Maoist insurgency was a reaction to the failures of state institutions to meet the 
needs of the Nepali people. The state failed to make a timely intervention and did not adopt 
reform measures, and thus laid the groundwork for the Maoist insurgency. As Chapter I 
notes, poverty, inequality, political instability, and widespread injustice are the significant 
causes for any insurgency to begin.64 The Nepalese government’s failures and 
miscalculations to understand the socio-economic condition of the conflict led to the 
serious social, economic, and political underpinnings of the insurgency, and the state 
likewise failed in addressing the wide range of grievances in the ethnic, social, economic, 
and political sectors. The severe economic, political, and social conditions endured by 
Nepal’s rural population remained abysmal: throughout 104 years of the Rana regime that 
ended in 1950, nine years of the multiparty system from 1950 to 1959, and 30 years of 
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party-less Panchayat rule from 1960 to 1990, and again in the post-1990s, the democratic 
constitutional monarchy system did not transform the social and economic condition of the 
Nepalese citizens. As Anand Swaroop Verma and Gautam Navlakha argue, the Maoist 
insurgency “did not emerge in a vacuum or out of simply exploiting opportunities ... it 
emerged after long years of political work amongst the people, debating the failings of 
earlier struggle.”65 Several factors, therefore, were instrumental in the eruption of the 
insurgency including widespread corruption, poverty, ill governance, social inequality, and 
many others, which are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
1. Political Economy 
The continuous economic decline in Nepal after 1990 played a critical role in the 
rise of the insurgency. For several generations, underlying extreme poverty festered in 
Nepal, and economic inequality became a major and robust source of support for the 
insurgency.66 The economic conditions of the country and the people are always of 
paramount importance in the rise of grievances that lead to political violence like the 
Maoist insurgency.67 Scholars point to poverty as a significant determinant of insurgency 
and relate it to the various strata of society. Poverty materializes from geographic 
circumstances, social inequality, and educational opportunity. As Do and Iyer argue, poor 
societies tend to produce insurgencies more often, because without any hope of economic 
change and driven by their frustration with government, the population tends to join 
insurgencies with less hesitation.68 
These conditions were present in Nepal at the time of the post-1990s democratic 
movement, when Nepal remained in extreme poverty and fell into the list of the poorest 
countries in the world. At the time, Nepal had the second-lowest gross national income in 
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South Asia.69 Poverty impacted a large portion of the population, and was exacerbated by 
decreased land productivity that affected the people’s daily basic needs. The number of 
poor kept rising, with 40 percent of the population falling below the poverty line.70 The 
agriculture and the social development sectors deteriorated dramatically after 1990 due to 
the government’s poor policies and their inadequate implementation. Though the national 
economic indicators were improving, economic inequality was rapidly growing in the 
country.71 According to one study, 71 percent of the wealth was in the hands of 12 percent 
of the population.72 The number of poor who could not access basic needs increased in this 
period, and the development benefits after the reinstatement of democracy reached only 
the elites in the urban areas. Poverty brought a terrifying sign of social conflict that might 
lead to the emergence of an insurgency. As Do and Iyer posit, “the lack of economic 
opportunities ... is significantly and robustly correlated with a higher intensity of 
violence,”73 and the rapid escalation of the Maoist insurgency can be viewed as the result 
of the generations of poverty in Nepal. Maoists took up the issue of extensive poverty and 
urged the people to join them to fight against the regime. Consequently, Nepalese citizens 
who remained under the poverty line for an extended period and who were denied any 
governmental reforms readily participated in the Maoist insurgency.74  
In particular, the disparity in the distribution of land resources in Nepal, where the 
majority of the population relies on agriculture for day to day survival, was a prime cause 
of the Maoist insurgency. A census in 1991 showed that around 88 percent of Nepal’s 
population was living in a rural area, drawing their main income from agriculture.75 Yet, 
the diverse class structure of Nepal was constructed on a semi-feudal mechanism that 
primarily distributed most to the elite class. This unequal land distribution among the 
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villagers who relied heavily on agriculture created considerable economic disparities. 
Though a few earlier attempts at land reform were made in Nepal, those efforts did not 
favor the general population. The transition to a democratic constitutional monarchy in 
1990 created expectations among the population for the betterment of the country, but the 
successive government administrations failed in delivering services because the elites 
controlled the resources of the country, which hampered the state’s effort to change the 
lives of the general public. 
As land ownership was mostly concentrated among a small group of elites, the 
majority of peasants sought redistribution of land. Baburam Bhattarai, the political 
ideologue of the Maoist party, claimed various reasons for the rise of the Maoist 
insurgency, noting that “70 percent of the population [was] under absolute poverty, half of 
the national income in the hands of 10 percent, 60 percent of the population illiterate, 90 
percent … living on agriculture, 81 percent of the labor force engaged in poor agriculture 
occupations, and 60 percent of the population under-employed.”76 The major portion of 
the population remained deprived of land and so harbored anti-government sentiments. 
The Maoists addressed these sentiments and mobilized lower and middle-class 
peasants to support the insurgency. Maoists formulated a strategy to drive out the 
landowners from their areas and promised to redistribute the land among the landless and 
cancel their debts.77 As Madhav Joshi and David Mason argue, the root of the Maoist 
insurgency was based on the concentration of land ownership; the Maoists successfully 
used the issue of land inequality to encourage violent political conflicts. Moreover, they 
knew that the solution to this inequality was the re-distribution of land, which served their 
ideological objectives ultimately. 
Poverty in Nepal also diminished the state’s ability to control the Maoist 
insurgency. Studies show that “the poorer the state, the weaker the state,” and therefore, 
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Nepal was unable to fight and counter the insurgency.78 The poverty and scarcity of 
resources in governmental forces and logistically poor forces were not able to handle the 
conflict in time. The government failed in strengthening the capacity of the armed forces, 
which hindered the counterinsurgency operations. 
Thus, the poverty caused by landlessness, underdevelopment, inefficient 
governmental policies, illiteracy, and the unequal distribution of resources led the deprived 
people of Nepal to join the Maoist insurgency and fight for their demands. Maoists 
leveraged those shortcomings of the government and were successful in mobilizing the 
people. 
2. Ethnic Dimension Behind the Insurgency—Identity Politics 
Nepal’s Maoist insurgency also benefited from the government’s lack of attempts 
to address the grievances of ethnic minorities who repeatedly demanded their equal access 
to resources and participation in the political process. According to the World Fact Book, 
Nepal is home to 125 caste/ethnic groups and 123 languages, and ethnicity plays a vital 
role in Nepal.79 The top-most ranks in Nepal are occupied by a Bahin and Chhetri group 
who account for only 28.8 percent of the population while other caste and ethnic groups 
are excluded from political and economic participation. Those groups forming a majority 
of the population were marginalized and held only a few minor positions, and thus, this 
exclusion fueled frustration and humiliation that developed into deeply rooted grievances 
in the long run. Identity issues play a major role in national politics, though this issue 
remained silent during the Rana and Panchayat rule as those regimes curtailed ethnic 
political expression. Various ethnic movements and their calls for equal participation and 
inclusion in the political system contributed to the democratization of 1990 and dominated 
political discourse, creating awareness about ethnic issues. Nepal’s ethnic organizations 
after 1990 demanded the political and cultural rights of national inclusion for the 
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marginalized and asked for their equal representation. Nevertheless, their demands were 
not met. 
Nepal did not allow ethnic parties to operate freely, and as a Hindu state, it banned 
the expansion of other religions. This limitation imposed on ethnic parties and the lack of 
religious freedom formed vital issues that ignited a revolt in the form of the Maoist 
insurgency against the existing political structure. Maoists were able to leverage the 
sentiments of those marginalized ethnic groups who were not satisfied with the constitution 
of 1990.80 The Maoists offered these groups with an avenue to make their demands 
political. Many of those groups joined the Maoists because the Maoists promised them 
equality and addressed their grievances. The Maoists started forming the fronts of ethnic 
liberation and included the voices of those dissent groups.81 
3. Political Instability 
The political instability, factionalism, and inability in the political parties to run a 
stable government after 1990 also contributed to the rise of the Maoist insurgency.82 After 
the democratic movement of 1990, Nepal remained politically unstable as the democratic 
elite tried to consolidate power. The frequent change in government and the uncertainty of 
the political system in Nepal worsened due to the continuous rivalry between ruling and 
opposition parties. The politics of Nepal remained unchanged as the Panchayat regime 
leaders held major positions in the newly formed governments.83 Smruti S. Pattanaik notes 
that the frequent fluctuations in successive government administrations provide political 
parties less time to address economic and social issues, and consequently, those parties 
shift their focus from policy debates to coalition building.84 The parties in Nepal split and 
factionalized reflected Pattanaik’s assertion as they were more concerned about forming 
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governments than bringing about social transformation in the lives of the people, and no 
government administration paid attention to establishing development plans and policies 
that could bring a fundamental change in the lives of the citizens.85 As Mohan G. Francis 
posits, the “the centralized policy making and planning, frequent changes in governments 
and leaders at the central government … created non-continuity in developmental programs 
and policies with adverse effects on poverty and inequality, particularly in the distant 
regions of the country,” and the Maoists played on the worsened economy resulting from 
the “ill-economic reforms” that involved “de-licensing, privatization and foreign 
participation.”86 
The instability in politics had an adverse impact on Nepal’s overall development, 
and the lack of accurate policy and planning halted development projects, leaving most of 
the rural areas untouched by the central government. That instability was triggered by 12 
changes in government between 1991 and 2002.87 The political crisis deepened and was 
accompanied by illicit interest, which contributed to public dissatisfaction. The 
performance of the successive governments got so ineffective that people lost their hope 
of improvements from the state. The political parties failed in forming full-term 
governments and ended up in coalitions with other parties. Correspondingly, the people’s 
mass grievances grew due to the widespread corruption and poor performance of the state 
in policy implementation. Meanwhile, Maoist-affiliated student unions and trade 
organizations took this opportunity and organized a massive anti-government 
demonstration and expanded their organizations.88 
The failure of the government to formulate long-term plans to counter the 
insurgency and the inadequacy of the plans that were made helped the Maoists to expand 
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the insurgency.89 The poor-performing government, corruption, and indifferent attitude of 
authorities toward the socio-economic condition of the population contributed to the rise 
of the Maoists. Maoists were successful in capitalizing on these grievances and articulating 
the aspirations of the people. They promised to establish a “People’s Government” in areas 
where they held influence, which they did in 2001 after the initiation of the insurgency, 
and the Maoist’s ideology of an equal society fascinated the people in those areas.90 
Backed by the hardcore principle, Maoists maintained their status by rejecting government 
presence in backward areas of Nepal. 
4. Regional Politics and the Emergence of the Maoists 
The Maoists in Nepal were also aided by the international context of that period. 
When the world was rapidly heading towards liberal democracy and the Soviet Union was 
collapsing, Maoism in Nepal was getting a firm foothold. The Maoists’ rise was in strong 
contrast to contemporary trends in world politics. The reactions of neighboring countries 
to the burgeoning communist movement within Nepal raised nationalist sentiments in 
Nepal, and when those sentiments came to the surface the Maoists were able to leverage 
them. 
Historically, Nepal has been highly dependent on India for its international trade 
and business. Since Nepal is a landlocked country surrounded by India on three sides, and 
the two countries share a porous open border, India is a major and longstanding political 
actor in Nepal’s internal and external affairs. Notably, India aided the overthrow of the 
Rana regime and the establishment of democracy in the country in the 1950s. It also helped 
negotiate a Delhi Agreement among the Rana rulers, the king, and the NC, which was 
signed on Indian soil.91 Yet Nepalese citizens are always of a notion that India applies 
political pressure on various political forces in Nepal to advance New Delhi’s ideas and 
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political agenda. Specifically, Nepalese believe that after the success of the Chinese 
revolution in 1949, India compelled Nepal to sign a treaty that prevents friendly relations 
between Nepal and China and stipulates Kathmandu purchase any necessary arms only 
from India.92 India is a dominant factor not only in the political sphere but also in Nepal’s 
economic sector as Nepal relies on India for most of its trade. Additionally, as Nepal has 
lacked any development in its industrial sector, India is an employment hub for Nepal’s 
population, and many Nepalese have migrated to India for their economic survival. Thus, 
India also often gets accused of exploiting the Nepalese peasants who work across the open 
border. The Maoists were able to use such anti-India sentiment to gain support from the 
population.93  
Furthermore, the mutual interests of Indian and Nepalese Maoists formed another 
catalyst for the insurgency. As Li Onesto argues, the Maoists who raised sentiments for a 
people’s war while they were sheltered in India had a close link with Indian Maoists waging 
armed insurrection against the Indian state.94 CPN Masal led by Mohan Baidhya was a 
member of RIM, which bore an Indian Maoist influence, and later on, when Prachanda 
became the leader of that faction, as Cailmail Benoît argues, RIM played an important role 
in convincing the party to launch the armed insurgency after a detailed analysis of world 
communist events.95 
The Maoists were also assisted by developments in China during that period. 
Although the Maoists accepted the influence of the Chinese revolution, they initially 
denounced the Chinese government and labeled it ‘revisionist’socialist in name but 
capitalistic in nature.96 Nonetheless, the leaders of Nepal’s Maoist party repeatedly stated 
that the cultural revolution in China had a tremendous impact and influence on the 
insurgency in Nepal, and they borrowed many lessons from it to inspire the Nepalese 
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people. Maoists used Mao’s term “New Democratic Revolution” that aimed to topple 
existing regimes in order to establish a socialist state.97 The theory propounded by Mao 
holds the notion of an insurrection unfolding in two phases: the first is a new democratic 
revolution by the peasants to destabilize the imperialistic structure and to transform the 
feudal and capitalistic economy, and the second establishes the socialistic state. 
Such specific international historical context focused on political trends and events 
laid the groundwork for the eruption of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and the state had 
to then address it within this larger context. 
D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE MAOIST INSURGENCY 
After 1990, the democratically led Nepalese state adopted harsh and suppressive 
measures to deal with the Maoist insurgency, causing further marginalization among its 
discontented citizens. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton argue, “As the state increases 
repression, more people will mobilize around the rebel cause to avoid the abuse at the hands 
of the state,” and thus, the majority of marginalized and oppressed people in Nepal, who 
were victimized by the brutality the state, became Maoist sympathizers and came to rely 
on the insurgents for protection.98 Thus, the post-democratic situation, created a favorable 
environment for the Maoists due to the state’s abuse of power abuses and repression. 
Similary, the exclusionary constitution and the poor performance of the state provided 
Maoists an opportunity to expand their cause to the broader population. Meanwhile, 
however, the new constitution guaranteed fundamental political, human, and civil rights. 
Moreover, in a democratic system that had provisions promoted by international 
organizations and freedom of the press, the state could not openly suppress the insurgency 
as it did during 1971 when the “Jhapa Insurgency” occurred. While those constitutional 
and civil rights were set in writing, in practice the state still used the available local police 
to arrest, imprison, and torture members of the party, and thus, Maoists suffered under the 
harsh behavior of the state. 
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In fact, the ruling party, the Nepali Congress, used all of the institutional power of 
government to subdue the conflict. Their approach was to use force rather than win the 
hearts and minds of the population. Prior to the insurgency, the state launched the ironically 
named “Operation Romeo” in 1995 to curb the expanding movements of the Maoist 
organization, and after the initiation of insurgency, the state launched “Kilo-Sierra-Two,” 
which caused massive destruction, death, rape, and arrests of the local population in the 
mid-western region of Nepal. These brutal and oppressive measures undertaken by the 
democratic government had the opposite effect; rather than quash the nascent insurgency, 
it pushed the people further into the Maoist fold.99 To justify its targeting of the movement, 
the state ensured the election commission refused to recognize the Maoist party. 
Despite its brutal measures, the state could not contain the insurgency and lost 
control in the insurgent base areas. Scholars often blame states for their inappropriate 
strategies in dealing with such insurgencies.100 And this was the case in Nepal, where the 
traditional police force was unable to divide the insurgency and the government could not 
mobilize the army since the king, who was constitutionally empowered as the supreme 
commander, refused to authorize the mobilization, which further complicated the situation 
for the government.  
As the insurgency dragged on and the political leaders could not control it, the king 
seized power and suspended the political parties. Finally, he sought to eliminate the 
Maoists through military measures. His actions triggered a reversal of democracy that 
created an environment for the Maoists to enter the political field. As civilian authorities 
had been undermined by the king, a power vacuum was created. These conditions allowed 
for previously unthinkable alliances and cooperation between the alienated political parties 
and the Maoists. After years of political struggle, the Maoists, together with other political 
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parties, were able to launch the mass movement of 2006 that changed the political structure 
of the country, abolished the monarchy, and turned Nepal into a republican state.101 
E. THE END OF THE INSURGENCY AND THE MAOISTS’ ENTRY INTO 
MAINSTREAM POLITICS 
The Maoists ended their insurgency and promised to advance their agenda 
peacefully by joining in mainstream politics on January 7, 2007, when they formally signed 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the deadliest insurgency in 
Nepal.102 After several layers of efforts made by national and international actors in 
different periods and contexts, and through various previous agreements and written 
understandings between the Maoists and the political parties of Nepal, Maoists finally 
agreed to put down their arms and adopt the multiparty democratic system in Nepal.103 
Maoists’ entry into mainstream politics confirmed the peaceful abolition of the 240-year-
old monarchy, the eradication of feudalism, and the participation of marginalized people 
in national politics, through the election of the Constitutional Assembly that established 
the Federal Republic of Nepal. The Constitutional Assembly guaranteed marginalized 
communities participation in the political system through a fixed percentage allotted to 
them, which was a remarkable achievement brought about by the Maoists’ struggle, along 
with many other triumphs. Thus, the Maoist 10-year-long armed insurgency proved 
instrumental in changing the political structure of the country. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Maoist Party emerged from the first communist party established in Calcutta 
in 1949 and which later splintered after the party’s fourth convention in 1974, clearly 
marking the factions within the CPN who supported the democratic ideology and the 
hardliners. Radicalism within the party remained intact following Rana rule, 30 years of 
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Panchayat rule, and also after the democratic transformation of 1990. The Maoists gained 
the people’s support because the government failed to adequately address the prolonged 
conditions of poverty, inequality, and widespread social and political injustice in Nepalese 
society. In 1994, after the election commission refused to recognize their party’s 
legitimacy, the Maoists openly challenged the state by launching an armed insurgency that 
would last a decade. The state tried to curb the Maoists through military and suppressive 
measures, but the population’s overwhelming support for the insurgency forced the state 
to compromise with the Maoists. The Maoists also came to a compromise after the royal 
coup amid the changed political scenario. These conditions also drew all the political 
parties that had been deprived of their political rights to consider some of the Maoists’ 
demands. Through a series of agreements and understandings, Maoists finally surrendered 
and started their peaceful political journey after they signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2007 that formally declared their entry into mainstream politics. The end of 
the Maoist insurgency resulted in the dissolution of the 240-year-old monarchy, the 
eradication of feudalism from the country, and the guarantee of participation by 
marginalized groups in the political sphere. Thus, the country witnessed a radical change 
from constitutional monarchy to republican state, which resulted from the Maoist violent 
decade-long insurgency. What remains unclear, however, is what drove the Maoists to drop 
their arms, come to the negotiating table, and ultimately join mainstream politics, which is 
the subject of next two chapters. 
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III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE INSURGENCY: A 
FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 
The Maoists’ strategic shift toward democratic behavior after the royal intervention 
in politics in 2005 changed their political journey and also brought the long, violent 
insurgency to an end. To understand of why the Maoist party leadership decided to lay 
down their arms and participate in mainstream politics requires further examination of the 
Maoists’ military-political actions and reactions in the larger context of mainstream 
political developments. How did the shift in mainstream politics influence the Maoists’ 
decision? What openings were created for them by the royal coup and the king’s banning 
of all political parties? This chapter investigates the turbulent political scenario surrounding 
the insurgency. It examines the role that domestic political opportunity played for the 
Maoists in pursuing their aims through mainstream politics, including the government’s 
policy and strategy in dealing with the conflict. 
This chapter begins by analyzing the strategies of the Maoists and how they were 
successful in implementing their plan to achieve their aims, which incorporated a turn to 
politics. This analysis is followed by an account of the succeeding governments’ 
counterinsurgency measures; this section examines the effectiveness of the measures 
adopted by the government and why those approaches failed in countering the insurgency 
and drove the Maoists to seek legitimacy through politics. The chapter also analyzes the 
rise of the monarch in 2001, the role of the king in escalating the internal rifts among the 
Maoists, his use of Nepal’s constitutional provisions to maintain his authority over the 
political parties as the head of state, and how Nepal’s political parties were thereby kept 
out of state affairs and willing to align themselves with the Maoists. The chapter also 
examines the internal ideological conflict within the Maoist party, as its leadership also 
had to reach a consensus in order to join mainstream politics. The chapter then explores 
the agreements between the Maoists and the other political parties that led the Maoists to 
enter mainstream politics. 
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A. MAOIST STRATEGIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 
In the long run, the Maoists were successful in implementing their strategies to 
achieve their political aims in a way favored by the changing political scenario during the 
insurgency. Bard E. O’Neill argues that developing nations lack national integration and 
economic development because of societal divisions rooted in economic and political 
differences.104 Nepal presented such conditions that fueled the insurgency; the Maoists’ 
insurgency emerged from the country’s underdevelopment and the failure of national 
integration, which then allowed them to successfully spread their agenda and organization 
across the country. Their success in convincing the masses presented them with an 
opportunity to enter mainstream politics from a powerful position. 
The adoption of a well-planned strategy helped the Maoists achieve their aim. The 
Maoists followed Mao’s doctrine of the people’s war, which has three phases—“strategic 
defense, strategic stalemate or equilibrium, and strategic offensive.”105 During the 
insurgency, the Maoists in Nepal were able to modify Mao’s revolutionary strategies to fit 
the existing internal conditions. Specifically, they changed their strategy from strategic 
offensive to political maneuvering. As a result, they were able to expand their covert and 
overt operations and turn the public opinion against the state.106 
To formalize their strategy for the insurgency, in March 1995, the Maoists held an 
organization-wide planning meeting that identified their advantages.107 As Mika 
Kerttunen observes, despite their lack of outside support, the insurgents capitalized on 
domestic factors such as the mountainous geography of Nepal that favored the Maoists, 
 
104 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, First ed. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc, 2005), 3–
5. 
105 Winne Gobyn, “From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists’ Strategic and Ideological Thinking,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 5 (May 1, 2009): 420–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/
10576100902831578. 
106 “One Year of People’s War in Nepal: A Review,” The Worker, no. 3 (February 1997), 
http://www.bannedthought.net/Nepal/Worker/Worker-03/OneYearOfPW-Review-W03.htm. 
107 Mika Kerttunen, “A Transformed Insurgency: The Strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) in the Light of Communist Insurgency Theories and a Modified Beaufrean Exterior/Interior 
Framework,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 78–118, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09592318.2011.546583. 
37 
and the support of the majority of the population for their cause.108 Further, the insurgents 
had been successful in seizing certain areas without any major warfare, which helped to 
gain broader support as per their strategy. Furthermore, they sought the Nepalese 
diaspora’s support for the insurgency.109 After the Maoists initiated their insurgency on 
February 13, 1996, they undertook a six-phase strategic plan: 
• February to October 1996−’March along the path of people’s war to 
smash the reactionary state and establish a new democratic state’: hit-
and-run attacks against police stations and other governmental 
institutions with the aim of expelling the state institutions. 
• October 1996 to August 1997−’Planned development of guerrilla 
warfare to prepare grounds to convert specific areas into guerrilla zones 
in the near future’: continuation of hit-and-run attacks together with 
killing and mutilating selected individuals. The purpose was to seize 
weaponry and to paralyze possible local opposition and political 
adversaries. 
• August 1997 to autumn 1998−’Develop guerrilla warfare to new 
heights’: a transitional phase where the village development 
committees, local administration, were to be wiped out. 
• Autumn 1998 to October 1999−’Advance in the great direction of 
creating base area’: formal establishment of base areas and restructuring 
of the guerrilla force into main, secondary, and base forces. 
• October 1999 to June 2000−Concentrate on ambushes, sabotage, and 
coordinated attacks against the police as well as information operations 
(propaganda). Company size units were introduced in the People’s 
Liberation Army. 
• June 2000 to February 2001−Focus on consolidating the base areas. The 
establishment of an administrative structure for the base areas. Two 
major shows of force by storming Dunai, the district headquarters in 
Dolpa (in September 2000) and the police stations in Rukum and 
Dolakha (in April 2001).110 
The most important elements of the Maoists’ initial strategy were drawing national 
and international attention to their cause and convincing the general population of their 
objectives. Thus, during their first phase of strategic defense from 1996 to 2001, the 






capabilities of their armed wings, and planned how to achieve their envisaged roles in 
various parts of the country.111 Militarily, they relied on tactics such as attacking the police 
and avoiding the army, because they did not want to challenge the army in the initial phase 
due to the army’s superior capabilities. A prominent early example of this strategy was 
their attack on “seven strategic locations”112 such as security posts and financial 
institutions in various districts of Nepal. The Maoists claimed that they selected those 
widespread targets, including banks and military installations, for their “geophysical and 
socioeconomic significance” and to restrict the state from concentrating its armed forces 
in one place.113 With their further severe armed attacks on police posts and commercial 
banks in Pyuthan, Dolpa, Lamjung, and Ramechhap, the Maoists were able to draw 
national and international attention. The Maoists’ killings of class enemy-groups like 
police informers, local tyrants, and other ideological opponents created a sense of fear 
among the population. Politically, the insurgents also organized general strikes in the 
capital and throughout the country. To win the hearts and minds of the local population, 
the Maoists started village development and cooperative programs through their political 
bodies, which mobilized the masses through open and legal activities. In addition, the 
Maoists issued thousands of leaflets and posters conveying political messages as part of 
their initiation of the armed struggle. For three weeks after the start of the insurgency, the 
Maoists performed 5,000 actions, mainly distributing propaganda to all the corners of the 
country to spread the message that the insurgency was firmly established. 
In addition to creating and carrying out an effective strategy, the Maoists, according 
to their documents published in books and newspapers, were also prompt in analyzing their 
early errors and in evaluating their relationship to the masses.114 As a result, during the 
initial two years of insurgency, the Maoists successfully recruited militias, acquired arms, 
created a climate of fear, and banished government officials from their major areas of 
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influence.115 The Maoist party was then able to wage a protracted war. Due to the 
geographical situation, their strategy of encircling the cities from the rural areas in Nepal 
allowed them to attack the state quite successfully.116 
After years of conflict, the Maoists started their “Strategic Equilibrium” phase in 
February 2001 after holding a national conference, which opened up the possibility of 
political participation while continuing their armed resistance.117 This conference stressed 
the need for combined actions of the military and political wings of the party. The Maoists 
established a new guideline named “Prachandapath,” similar to the Shining Path of Peru, 
that combined Leninist traits with the strategies of Mao and demanded their combined 
action in urban and rural areas. In the following months, the country witnessed a direct 
confrontation between the army and the Maoists in various parts of the country. The state 
labeled the Maoists “terrorists” and imposed a state of emergency in the country.118 The 
fatalities on both sides increased drastically during this period. 
The Maoists during this stage also initiated their political engagement, albeit mostly 
for the purpose of enhancing their military capabilities and gaining time to regroup their 
militias. They demanded peace talks six times and asked the government to address their 
demands for a constitutional assembly, formation of an interim government, and 
promulgation of a new constitution.119 The government, at that point stronger and more 
confident than the Maoists, rejected their demands for peace talks and continued using 
coercive measures. Nevertheless, the Maoists and the government conducted negotiations 
two times, and both sides tried to prove that their political demands were in the interests of 
the people as well as that they were driven to achieve a political solution. Meanwhile, the 
Maoists, using the negotiating period for reorganizing and upgrading their capabilities, 
carried out multiple attacks on major strategic locations, proving their military capability 
to fight against the state. 
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In the final stage of strategic offense, which started after 2004, the Maoists 
continued their political engagement as well as armed attacks on selected army members, 
political leaders, and government servicemen but avoided large-scale attacks to gain 
political legitimacy. The Maoists did not, as Mao’s offensive phase demands, carry out 
large-scale warfare against the state during this phase. Yet, they continued their operations; 
they attacked around half a dozen places, causing massive fatalities to the government 
side.120 In response, they ended up facing hard counter-strategies, as the government 
forces were well-fortified and trained by this time, and the Maoists lost many guerillas in 
the attacks. The Maoists could neither hold any areas nor successfully capture or control 
the urban areas, so the final stage of the “people’s war” doctrine actually did not happen.121 
Nevertheless, during the severe counterinsurgency operations, the Maoists were 
presented with an opening that allowed them to shift their strategy to mainstream politics, 
which they saw as an opportunity to achieve their objectives. Due to the changing political 
scenario after the royal takeover of the government and the political response from Nepal’s 
other political parties, the Maoists were able to lay down their arms and join hands with 
other parties and so evade a direct and large-scale military confrontation with the army. 
Mao’s doctrine of adjustment allowed this change in the strategy. Theoretically, Mao’s 
people’s-war strategy consists of methodical progress in three phases, but insurgents may 
realize their victory at any stage if the state loses spirit.122 If one form of victory is rendered 
impossible, the leadership needs to assess its strategy and make adjustments, which the 
Maoists did in the case of Nepal. The changing political situation of Nepal favored the 
Maoists, allowing them to achieve political supremacy more effectively through political 
maneuvering and cooperation with other political parties than by continuing the 
insurgency. Their entry into the political arena at this time led to the dethroning of the 
monarch, after which they gained 83 seats out of 330 seats in the legislature of the interim 
government. 
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In summary, the Maoists had a clear vision and plan during their insurgency that 
gained them popular support; however, what ultimately made their movement successful 
was their ability and willingness to modify their strategy to achieve victory. The Maoists 
in Nepal experienced battlefield setbacks and harsh state countermeasures, which forced 
them to modify their strategy.123 Additionally, insurgencies achieve victory “small, 
secretive, disciplined, and tightly organized” groups, which the Maoists already had, and 
through winning over “the urban centers, especially the country’s capital city where 
political and economic power is concentrated.”124 The Maoists accomplished that goal as 
well by changing their strategies and joining the other political parties—proving 
themselves a powerful political force in Nepal. The Maoists were able to capitalize on the 
opportunity they were offered and thereby successfully managed to join mainstream 
politics in Nepal. Thus, the Maoists’ entry into Nepalese politics is the result of their well-
planned strategy and timely flexibility. 
B. GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY MEASURES 
Several weaknesses in the Nepalese government’s early attempts at 
counterinsurgency also contributed to the Maoists’ eventual decision to join mainstream 
politics. Joint Publication 3-24 of the United States defines the counterinsurgency measures 
of the state as “the combination of measures undertaken by a government ... to defeat an 
insurgency.”125 According to Joint Publication 3-24, counterinsurgency measures should 
have a political strategy as their core, should respond to changes in the strategy, tactics, 
and operations of the insurgents, and must focus on the causes, motives, and the means of 
the population involved in the conflict. When the government fails in gaining the support 
of the population and loses legitimacy, it cannot effectively counter an insurgency. The 
Nepali government’s weak responses to the political and social issues confronting the 
population produced and helped sustain the Maoists’ insurgency. Instead of taking a broad 
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approach, the state relied only on police and military measures, neglecting political and 
socioeconomic efforts to deal with the insurgency.126 Though the government was not 
fully successful in containing the insurgency, the counterinsurgency measures forced the 
Maoists to opt for the alternative of mainstream politics after they experienced some 
setbacks on the battlefield. 
The government neglected the Maoists’ demands from the very beginning and 
instead sought to solve the insurgency by force. After the Maoists submitted their 40-point 
demands in February 1996, the government, led by the democratic Nepali Congress, failed 
to look into the issues raised by the Maoists.127 The government displayed confusion and 
differences of opinion on how to respond to the insurgency. As Deepak Thapa and Bandita 
Sinjapati write, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was willing to settle the conflict 
through a political approach, but the then home minister, Khum Bahadur Khadka, strongly 
urged a military solution to the problem.128 Some other members of the government also 
rejected out of hand the Maoists’ demands that contradicted the existing constitution.129 
Moreover, the government also was not serious about capitalizing on the consensus among 
the other political parties that wanted to address the Maoists’ insurgency.130  
Nevertheless, the government did make some efforts toward political solutions and 
to address the Maoist insurgency. In April 1997, the government formed the Working 
Committee for the Study of Maoist Activities and Finding Solutions, under Prem Singh 
Dhami, a member of the parliament, who provided detailed instructions to the government 
about how to address the Maoist insurgency and the causes behind it. It offered a 
comprehensive analysis of the Maoist insurgency, including its growth, organizational 
plans, and strategies. This commission also recommended socioeconomic reforms, 
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admitted the government’s shortcomings with regard to the dealing with the Maoists’ 
insurgency, and declared the necessity to bring the Maoists into a constitutional frame. 
The repeated change in governments during this time, however, hampered the 
implementation of those recommendations.131 As a result, the insurgency continued. 
During the initial phase of the insurgency, each successive government focused merely on 
its own political survival rather than on resolving the insurgency. Furthermore, the 
government’s responding force, the Nepal Police, was not able to effectively counter the 
Maoists who were well prepared in their strategies. Indeed, the police force was 
underequipped and was not trained to counter the insurgency. Instead the use of police 
created a state of agitation and fear among the citizens. The police operations adopted the 
strategy of “encircling and killing,” which resulted in the killings of more innocent civilians 
than actual Maoist guerrillas. The government further responded to the Maoist attacks 
through the “Kilo Sierra Two” operation in 1998, which used extreme measures that 
resulted in killing the Maoists along with innocent civilians in the Maoists-held areas, while 
other civilians were raped, tortured, and jailed for no reason.132 The government actions 
to contain the Maoists through police operations thus resulted in numerous extrajudicial 
killings. 
The use of police force against the motivated Maoists failed as the atrocities of the 
police operations undermined the objectives of the government to bring the Maoist 
insurgency to a lawful resolution. Some reports suggest that police killed more civilians 
than Maoists in their anti-Maoist operations.133 The rural population most frequently 
became the victim of severe governmental actions, causing those people to embrace the 
Maoists’ way as the only way forward. The police brutality thus fueled the insurgency: as 
Thapa and Sijapati note, in a nationwide poll, 30 percent of the participants believed that 
“police violence was to blame for the increase of Maoists’ activities.”134 Prakash Adhikari 
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and Steven Samford also confirm that the Maoist insurgency spread “as a response to a 
surge of indiscriminate violence committed by the state.”135 Moreover, the government 
failed to provide services in the hardest-hit conflict areas, where Maoists had huge support 
that emerged from the various underlying causes of the insurgency.136 And, therefore, the 
Maoists were successful not only in their strategic planning, but also profited from the 
coercive measures of the state. 
The government’s missteps during its initial response allowed the Maoists to 
maintain their momentum. In 1999, the Nepali Congress-led government tried to address 
the insurgency through the formation of the “High Level Committee to Provide 
Suggestions to Solve the Maoist Problem” under Sher Bahadur Deuba, authorizing peace 
talks with the Maoists.137 This committee recommended the continued use of the police 
and asked the government to seek peace talks, a latter recommendation that was neglected 
by the then-Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. Moreover, studies at the time showed 
that the government could not expand its administrative reach out of district headquarters 
into the 32 districts, and by 2001, this number reached 68, essentially decreasing the 
legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the populace.138 
During the second phase of the insurgency from 2001 to 2004, the government 
deployed severe counterinsurgency measures against the Maoists, but the Maoists 
benefited in gaining more popular support because of the coercive measures of the state 
that victimized the population and alienated them from the state. King Gyanendra imposed 
even more severe measures and declared a state of emergency, and mobilized the Royal 
Nepalese Army (RNA) against the Maoist insurgency. The army’s strategies were 
ineffective against the Maoists who were politically motivated guerilla fighters whereas 
the army fought in a traditional way; instead, their coercive actions produced incentives for 
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the population to move toward the Maoists.139 As Lawoti et al. argue, the Army earned a 
reputation for “indiscriminate killings, arbitrary arrests, torture and disappearances” and 
presented the civilians no option but to support the Maoist insurgency, either for safety or 
for revenge.140 Lawoti and Pahari claim that the public inclination toward the Maoists was 
due to army’s suspicions of the villagers’ support for the Maoists, whereas the Maoists 
convinced the population that they could provide a strong alternative national identity, 
which attracted many moderates. 
King Gyanendra’s repressive legal measures further alienated the population after 
he suspended the people’s fundamental rights in the government’s promulgation of the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Ordinance (TADO) in November 2001. His moves, 
which enabled the government forces to make formerly illegal arrests and detentions, 
created a state of fear throughout the country.141 Due to the failure and paucity of available 
options, the government then launched the Integrated Security and Development Program 
(ISDP) and started conducting operations under the unified command of the RNA along 
with the formation of a paramilitary fighting force, the National Armed Police Force, to 
fight against the Maoists, but this combined effort also failed to contain the Maoists’ 
movements and actions.142 The ISDP finally tried to incorporate political campaigns and 
development programs under the RNA to counter the insurgency. The RNA’s historical 
linkage to the monarchy, however, undermined its political influence, and it could not win 
popular support; the legitimacy of this deployment of the RNA was not widely accepted 
by the population. As a result, even if there was a portion of the population that supported 
the government’s actions, the state could not safeguard those supporters who were 
eventually coerced and silenced by the Maoists.143 
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Overall, the state failed to demonstrate the will, means, or ability to win against the 
Maoists by over relying on armed response to the insurgency. As Connable and Libicki 
argue, military means can defeat only some insurgencies.144 However, the government of 
Nepal focused only on military measures to address the Maoists’ insurgency and failed to 
adopt a holistic and comprehensive approach, which would have included all the possible 
political, social, and economic measures, as well as the military ones to end the 
insurgency.145 By the time the insurgency reached its peak, the state was also unable to 
provide the resources that could contain or defeat the threat. As a result, the Maoists’ 
people’s governments in the Maoist-controlled areas became more legitimate compared to 
the government’s administration. As Timothy R. Kreuttner posits, despite the 
peacekeeping and operational experience of the RNA, the state failed in formulating a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency framework and influencing the population, and the use 
of military force alone was ineffective in the long run.146 As the JP 3-24 states, if an 
insurgency persists for long, “the government succumbs to the pressure over time and the 
insurgents favorably negotiate an end,”147 and the Maoists were able to negotiate a 
favorable conclusion for their insurgency when the government of Nepal failed in 
containing the conflict. 
Yet, regardless of the government’s initial inability to contain the insurgency fully, 
it was still able to deny the Maoists any permanent base areas, which compelled the Maoists 
to look for other options to achieve their agenda in the long run. The option that presented 
itself was entering into mainstream politics. During the latter phases of the insurgency, the 
government successfully decreased the Maoists’ fighting capabilities through a series of 
victories against the insurgents’ attacks on military camps.148 During this phase, the armed 
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forces of Nepal were able to develop their military capabilities, and their strong 
fortification of the security camps stopped the Maoists’ insurgency from gaining further 
geographic momentum. At the same time, the government of Nepal classified the Maoists 
as “terrorists,” and the state received sufficient external assistance during the “War on 
Terror” campaign after Al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. 
At the local level, the Maoists were unable to hold any areas for a lengthy duration, and 
were losing popular support due to their coercive and terror tactics. Likewise, they were 
losing support at the international level. Now classified as terrorists, the Maoists were 
denied any activities abroad, and this denial greatly limited their freedom to operate and 
make strategic decisions. This political development was a major setback for the Maoists; 
it increased their need for legitimacy. Consequently, the Maoists were pushed towards 
political participation in the democratic system. 
In addition, the state’s continued inability to address the underlying issues of the 
insurgency impacted the country’s political setting, essentially giving Maoists the window 
to join politics and influence the legal political process as the government managed to slow 
the insurgency. The state’s inability to effectively control the insurgency also allowed the 
king to intervene in the nation’s political affairs by stepping into national politics in 2001. 
The monarch’s active interest in politics and gradual sidelining of existing political parties 
further worsened the situation. 
C. RISE OF THE PALACE AND DISSOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
An additional factor that led the Maoists into mainstream politics was the increasing 
influence of the monarch in internal politics, especially the king’s dissolution of Nepal’s 
political parties in 2005. These developments drove the Maoists to fight alongside the other 
parties against the authoritarian royal regime and thereby legitimize themselves. In 
particular, the royal coup created a convergence of interests among the Maoists and the 
other parties, all of which wanted to establish a republican state, leading them to work 
together and bringing the Maoists into mainstream politics. 
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The rise of the political power of the royalty in Nepal during the insurgency must 
be seen in the context of the country’s political instability after 1990: four parliamentary 
elections, six governmental recommendations for the dissolution of the House of 
Representatives, and 13 changes of government.149 Once the country’s internal security 
situation started deteriorating and Nepal became politically destabilized, the monarch 
seized political power and banned all political activities. The royal supporters and the 
discontented population at first remained optimistic while the national political parties and 
international community urged the king to reinstate the democracy. 
The monarch’s behavior during this period was suspicious in the eyes of Maoist 
leaders, as some of the leaders from the Maoist party claimed that the king wanted to create 
a void between the political parties and the Maoists that would weaken the political system 
and so invite the palace to intervene in politics.150 At the same time, some scholars argue 
that the Maoists were able to alienate the political parties from the palace so that the 
monarch and the political parties would not come together and the Maoists would not have 
to fight against them at the same time.151 
The monarchy had been inactive in politics for about a decade until June 1, 2001, 
when the family of King Birendra was killed in a royal massacre. The Maoists openly 
declared that the essence of the monarchy had vanished after the death of King Birendra.152 
Nevertheless, after the royal massacre, King Gyanendra, who ascended to the throne, 
strictly warned the political parties that he was not going to remain a ceremonial figure. 
Essentially, the king wanted to resume an active role in the national polity, which former 
kings enjoyed prior to 1990.153 To take this role, the king would need to change the 
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political structure of the country. In fact, as Sudheer Sharma argues, the Maoists and the 
monarch had “different objectives, but their target was the same,”154 to amend the 
constitution. The Maoists had denounced the 1990 constitution for its vested monarchical 
power, and the monarch himself was dissatisfied with this constitution, which turned the 
palace into a mere rubber stamp. 
Ultimately, King Gyanendra started intervening in the politics of Nepal in 2001.155 
The failures of the elected governments to conduct timely elections, the dissolution of local 
bodies, rising Maoist conflict, and the decision of Nepal’s political parties to postpone the 
general elections out of fear of insurgents’ violence provided opportunities for the king to 
intervene.156 The king eventually dissolved the House of Representatives in May 2002, 
and delayed the elections that were to be held in the same year, essentially allowing the 
king to seize political power. Subsequently, he formed three governments himself, 
radicalizing the political parties opposing his repression.157 Meanwhile, the state conflict 
with the Maoists intensified. After the Maoists defeated the police force, they attacked the 
RNA in 2001, and in response, the king mobilized the army against the Maoists and 
declared a state of emergency throughout the country.158 The RNA intensified its 
countermeasures against the Maoists, and the Maoists, in return, strengthened their attacks 
on the government forces. 
The monarch’s intervention in politics did not stop after seizing political power and 
reached its climax when the king seized executive power and finally launched a military 
coup using the RNA on February 1, 2005.159 The coup resulted in political leaders’ mass 
arrests, the shutdown of internet and communication systems, and press censorship. The 
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king tried to convince the people that monarchical rule could address their growing 
grievances and made his best effort to curb the insurgency, but during the king’s takeover 
from 2002 to 2005, the Maoists increased their presence from fewer than 15 districts to all 
75 districts. In response to the royal takeover, the Maoists started declaring their 
revolutionary shadow governments that, to some extent, restricted the government’s 
presence in the stronghold areas of the Maoists.160 Nepal’s other political parties along 
with the Maoists were furious about the dismissal of the elected government and became 
more aggressive in their denunciation of the monarch, which increased the popular 
demonstrations and Maoist attacks, and fueled a political crisis. 
The king’s authoritarian actions came under heavy scrutiny and criticism 
internationally. Instead of focusing on the Maoist insurgency in rural areas, the monarch 
mobilized the army against the political parties in urban areas and acted against the 
politicians, human rights activists, academics, and journalists and started arresting, 
censoring, and harassing them, and forbidding them to leave the country.161 The royal rule 
functioned more like an authoritarian regime than an attempt to control the insurgency. The 
International Crisis Group even demanded immediate action against the royal regime, 
citing the disappearance of people and the extrajudicial killings, as well as the RNA’s 
violent suppression of political figures and activists throughout the country.162 
Furthermore, its report demanded the suspension of all budgetary and military assistance 
to Nepal’s royal regime from all international stakeholders. 
The monarch’s increasingly autocratic regime eventually pushed the mainstream 
political parties toward the Maoists’ line. In response, the political parties acknowledged 
the republican idea, whereas the Maoists pledged to join the democratic multiparty system, 
forming an alliance against the king’s autocratic rule. The dissolved political parties had to 
join the Maoists, as they had armed guerillas to counter the regime’s security forces, and 
this armed power provided the Maoists an opportunity to join politics to further legitimize 
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their cause and a stage for political participation. The Maoists welcomed the alliance, as 
they were experiencing their own crisis of legitimacy due to their coercive operations: 
inflicting fatalities on innocent civilians, violating human rights, being classified as a 
terrorist organization at the national and international level, and facing decreased fighting 
capabilities and losses to government forces. The dissolution of the political parties and the 
army’s nationwide control declared by the king proved to be a mistake, as the Maoists and 
the political parties started dramatically de-establishing the state. Lawoti and Pahari also 
agree that the coup supported by RNA brought “the parliamentary political parties, media, 
human rights groups, [and] intelligence ... against the state and the military,”163 and the 
Maoists had an unimagined opportunity to bring all those actors together to fight against 
the royal coup. 
At first, the political parties formed the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and officially 
called on the Maoists to relinquish their violent activities and join in peaceful 
demonstration against the king, which was an important turn for the Maoists. In response, 
the Maoists agreed to the demands of the political parties to join hands to reinstate 
democracy in the country.164 It was an opportunity for the Maoists to use the political 
parties to achieve their long-standing goals. While the Maoists expected a fight against a 
unified monarch and political parties in the long run, the king’s actions provided the 
opportunity for the Maoists to join the political parties, and through this alliance, they were 
able to join mainstream politics. 
D. LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT WITHIN THE MAOIST 
PARTY 
An additional important factor that helped to bring the Maoists into mainstream 
politics was the internal ideological conflict among the leaders of the Maoist party and the 
resulting decision by the party to bring a meaningful end to the insurgency. The Maoists 
had long been going through internal ideological conflict about how to continue the 
insurgency. There were two clear factions in the Maoist party: the hardline and the 
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moderate line. The hardliners believed in the core communist principle of a people’s war 
to change the state into a republic, while the moderate wing believed that they could 
achieve their objectives through peaceful means. The party adopted a democratic internal 
power structure due to the continuous ideological disagreements. Within the changed 
political scenario of the royal coup, the moderate wing was able to use the democratic 
structure of the Maoist party to guide it towards mainstream politics. 
In addition, the two factions comprised two main groups in the Maoist party. The 
Kiran-led group was the hardliner faction, and the group headed by Baburam Bhattarai was 
the moderate wing. Baburam Bhattarai had a vision of establishing the republic of Nepal 
through a peaceful transformation of the insurgency by convening the election of a 
constitutional assembly, whereas Kiran, who was the party secretary, strictly advocated for 
communist armed revolution.165 Prachanda’s approach in response was to adopt a middle 
line of tactical flexibility and keep the door open for a constitutional assembly election. 
Ideologically, he was close to the Kiran group, and tactically, because of his association 
with the Indians, he was closer to Baburam. The Indian intelligence sector had had a long-
term relationship with the Maoists, since the start of the insurgency; as Sharma posits, the 
Indians’ effort was focused on sidelining the revolutionary wing and supporting the 
democratic wing. Thus, Baburam received the support of the Indians, which helped him to 
establish his moderate ideology in the party.166 
The leadership conflict within the Maoist party was the result of various other 
ideological dilemmas, which they had to solve during their insurgency. The rising 
ideological conflict and its solution eventually helped the Maoists to come into mainstream 
politics. For one, the possible loss of popular support posed a serious challenge and 
undermined the hardliner ideology, while increasing the credibility of the moderate faction, 
which led the Maoists to join national polity. Some scholars argue that the Maoists’ armed 
insurgency did not follow the doctrine of people’s war, which strictly advocates gaining 
the people’s support as of paramount importance. The Maoist leadership was therefore 
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serious about their continued loss of popular support among the citizens as they carried out 
their operations, during which many innocent civilians were killed and their properties 
were damaged. The loss of public support and the broadening of their base areas through 
hit-and-run guerrilla actions, assaults, propaganda, and sabotage made the Maoists look 
like a terrorist group rather than a revolutionary movement.167 
After the Maoists’ secret relations with the monarch were revealed, people started 
to doubt the Maoist agenda, which led to a greater loss of public support. At this point, the 
hardline faction was forced to soften their agenda. By the time the Maoists came for the 
second round of talks with the government in January−August 2003, the Maoists withdrew 
their main demand of holding a constitutional assembly and only demanded an interim 
constitution, interim government, and round-table conferences of the political parties 
instead of republican state that could settle the disputed issues.168 Such various disruptions 
within the party led the moderate factions to demand a reliable settlement, ultimately 
forging a way to enter peacefully into politics. 
The Maoists also faced the issue of identifying their prime enemy of the insurgency, 
which was a crucial issue between the two wings in the party. The moderate wing 
succeeded in identifying the Maoists’ prime enemy, which provided the moderates 
credibility to establish their cause within the party. In 2004, the Maoists had a strong debate 
regarding the primary enemy of the insurgency: the moderate Baburam Faction believed 
the monarchy to be the primary enemy,169 while the radical faction identified India as the 
main enemy because of its assistance to the monarch and its opposition to the Maoist party. 
India started sanctioning the Maoists’ activities, and the Maoists’ central committee leaders 
were arrested in India,170 which was a major setback to the Maoists, as they had their 
headquarters in India and all of their prominent leaders could face legal action if India so 
chose. In 2004, the leadership conflict within the Maoist party came to the fore in Nepal’s 
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national media and created a sharp existential debate among the top leadership. This 
conflict almost split the party—Baburam labeled Prachanda an “agent of the palace,” while 
Prachanda’s supporters labeled Baburam an “agent of India.” Later, in 2005, the Maoists’ 
politburo meeting decided to take punitive actions against the moderate faction leaders—
Baburam Bhattarai, Hisila Yami, and Dinanath Sharma—dismissing them from all their 
responsibilities in the party.171 However, King Gyanendra’s military coup two days after 
the party’s decision to punish Baburam proved Baburam right in his logic that the monarch 
was the prime enemy of the Maoists; so, the hardliners reversed this decision to maintain 
unity in the party.172 Baburam’s accurate assessment of the prime enemy created further 
room for moderate voices in the party. 
A third important issue raised by the moderate wing was the democratization of the 
Maoist party itself for decentralizing the internal chain of command and the resulting 
decentralization of power within the party, which allowed for debates within the party 
about their future strategy on how to pursue their objectives and find a proper resolution of 
the insurgency. The Maoist party’s decision in 2003 to democratize the party’s internal 
structure and to decentralize power-sharing remained unrealized until the end of the 
insurgency. Since the beginning of the insurgency, Prachanda had been the overall leader 
of the Maoist party, and he later assumed overall leadership of the Maoists’ military wing 
along with their newly formed people’s government, but the moderate wing wanted 
decentralization of power and democratization within the party.173 To diversify their 
strategy and produce more ideas about how to conduct their insurgency, the Maoist party 
adopted democratization in the party in 2005 and legitimized the moderate wing’s 
demands, signaling victory for the moderate wing. 
Therefore, under this new structure, the clash between the hardline and moderate 
wings was settled through a series of meetings and debates—core democratic processes 
that helped the Maoists enter mainstream politics. Due to the debates within the party and 
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expanding government actions against the Maoist party, the party’s Chungwang meeting 
in October 2005 decided that the forceful capture and communist transformation of the 
state was unattainable under the circumstances and reached a conclusion to agree to the 
multiparty democratic-republican agenda with Nepal’s other political parties. Thus, the 
moderate wing successfully established its cause, arguing that the Maoists could fight for 
their cause within mainstream politics and attain their agenda through the democratic 
process. The Kiran faction had no other option; they would almost certainly have lost to 
the government forces if they had not chosen a political solution, and the moderate wing’s 
modified version of entering into the politic arena for the peaceful settlement of the 
insurgency was acceptable to the hardliners. The hardliner Maoists were therefore forced 
to adopt the middle path to join mainstream politics.174 This change was an ideological 
shift in the Maoist party and the party’s moderate wing’s practical victory. As a result, the 
Maoists came together with other political parties, signing the 12-point agreement with the 
other political parties that formed the basis for the public uprising of 2006. 
In summary, the leadership conflict and the debate over the strategy of the Maoist 
party finally helped to provide them an avenue to enter into mainstream politics. Regardless 
of the personality clashes among the leadership and the strategic dilemma that resulted in 
a series of splits and mergers, the Maoists finally chose the pragmatic approach of adopting 
the democratic-republican agenda in place of a communist state system. The Maoists’ 
revision of their political objective of forming a communist state to the acceptance of a 
democratic approach was a key factor in bringing the Maoists into mainstream politics. 
E. NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 
While the royal coup, weak counterinsurgency measures of the government, and 
the success of the moderate wing in convincing the party to undertake democratic political 
participation created the conditions for the Maoists to enter into national politics, the 
Maoists were politically guided to the negotiation process with other parties and 
participated in various agreements. The peace agreements, negotiations, and the other 
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political parties played instrumental roles in paving the way for Maoists to enter the 
political mainstream. Hence, those negotiations and agreements must be taken into account 
when analyzing the Maoists’ entry into Nepalese politics. The first two sets of peace talks 
did not bring the Maoists into mainstream politics due to the lack of proper 
acknowledgment of the Maoists’ agenda and poor preparation of government as well as 
due to the rigidity of the Maoists, but the third set of peace talks happened after serious 
upheavals, which resulted in the achievement of the Maoists’ objectives. 
The first set of peace talks did not bring the Maoists into mainstream politics since 
they were not clear on their demands and the government was not ready to compromise on 
the constitutional monarchy. This peace talk between the Maoists and the government took 
place after the royal massacre, from August 2001 onwards.175 During the first round of 
peace talks, the Maoists had no specific agenda, but they demonstrated their political will 
for peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Maoists also used this time to extend their 
political relations with other communist parties within the country. In August, Maoist 
leader Prachanda held a meeting of left-wing parties and sought their support for his agenda 
in the peace talks, but the leading parliamentary communist party, CPN–UML, declined 
the proposal.176 
Before the second round of peace talks scheduled to take place on September 13–
14 of 2001, the 9/11 terrorist attacks happened in the United States, which changed 
international dynamics and affected the political conflict in Nepal as well. During the 
subsequent worldwide anti-terror campaign, the Maoists were placed on the terrorist group 
list by the United States of America and India.177 India banned Maoist sister organizations 
in its territory and took up strict control measures along its border. Nevertheless, the second 
round of peace talks were marked by 31-point demands from the Maoists mainly focused 
on institutionalizing the republican system in the country, promulgating a new constitution, 
and forming a new government, and securing the release of a few Maoist prisoners held by 
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the government. Here, the Maoists came up with their idea of a Constitutional Assembly 
election, abandoning their previous agenda to call for a republican state. During the third 
round of the 2001 peace talks, the government outright denied the Maoists’ demands, 
compelling the Maoists to return to armed attacks. As B. C. Upreti notes, the government 
lacked negotiation skills and had a preconceived notion not to accept any demands from 
the Maoists, and the Maoists, too, remained inflexible in their demands but did succeed in 
communicating their objectives to the public.178 The Maoists simultaneously carried out 
the negotiations with the other political parties while holding the peace talks with the 
government of Nepal, expressing their desire to work with CPN-UML and Nepali Congress 
to achieve their political agendas in 2001 and 2002, respectively. 
The Maoists and the government had a second set of peace talks in three rounds 
from April to August 2003, but the period from the first set of peace talks to the second set 
of peace talks had seen a massive change in Nepalese politics. The trustworthiness of the 
monarchy had been shaken by the royal massacre of June 2001, and the royal move of 
dissolving parliament in 2002 had detrimental effects on the political spectrum. The 
political parties were kept out of the national polity, and the palace wanted to solve the 
insurgency itself. All of these actions by the monarch provided more leverage to the 
Maoists to garner support for their side. The second set of peace talks dealt mainly with 
procedural issues as the Maoists tried to limit the RNA to a radius of five kilometers from 
the barracks and the government released some of the Maoist leaders.179 During this peace 
talk, the Maoists tried to maneuver politically and strongly reiterated their agenda of 
establishing a republican state through a constitutional assembly. The Maoists were using 
the peace talks as part of their strategy of increasing their strength and reorganizing and 
enhancing their military capabilities. The Maoists were rigid in their attitude, while the 
government also insisted on reforming the current government rather than addressing the 
main demands of the Maoists.180 Since the government did not accept any of the Maoists’ 
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demands, the ceasefire broke down on August 29, 2003, after the government attacked and 
killed Maoists in Doramba, Nepal. 
By 2004, the Maoists had expanded their influence to 80 percent of the country and 
had a strong presence in almost all the districts, and through this expansion of their 
influence, they were able to change their course toward mainstream politics.181 They were 
successful in their mission of expansion, as Ulrike Joras argues, employing “disruptive 
strikes, intensified violence, excessive use of force and a high number of human rights 
violations.”182 But after the royal takeover in 2005, the Seven Party Alliance was formed, 
and they agreed on a six-point guideline to carry out their struggle against the king. Then, 
undermined by the king, the SPA and Maoists agreed to struggle together and came up 
with a 12-point agreement, which strategized a way to revolt against the monarchy 
holistically and started the process of ending the violence of the people’s war, dethroning 
the 240-year-long monarchy, and restructuring the Nepalese state.183 On the basis of this 
agreement, the Maoists and the political parties started 19 days of nationwide mass protests 
that compelled the king to revive the House of Representatives before stepping down. The 
political parties then formed the interim government, which announced its commitment to 
the constitutional assembly’s election and invited the Maoists for peace talks. 
During the third set of peace talks, in May 2006, the Maoists and the political parties 
had settled most of the demands of the Maoists through the 12-point agreement, which 
eased the Maoists’ entry into national politics. The interim government declared various 
historical changes such as abolishing the monarchy, turning the RNA into the Nepali Army, 
and declaring the country a secular state. Subsequently, the Maoists and the government 
entered into an eight-point agreement to further strengthen their cooperation.184 Taking 
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into account the previous agreements and the basis of the mass uprising, the government 
also invited the Maoists to join the interim government as they held 73 seats out of 330 
seats in the legislature.185 Another six-point agreement in November laid the foundation 
for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the interim government and the Maoists, 
which was signed on the November 21, 2001. The signing was observed by diplomats, the 
media, and national and international dignitaries. This finally ended the decade-long armed 
insurgency in Nepal and brought the Maoists into mainstream politics. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter illustrates how the Maoists entered into mainstream politics of Nepal. 
The failure of the political institutions alienated not only the marginalized communities but 
also the broader population, and the government’s ineffective counter-insurgency 
strategies combined with the political upheaval among the country’s political elite created 
a space for negotiations and agreements that laid the foundations for Maoists journey into 
mainstream politics and legitimized their agenda in Nepal’s political spectrum. The 
Maoists also illustrated a flexibility in strategy. Their initial preplanned strategy was 
modified to achieve their objectives and address their mistakes. By contrast, the 
government lacked a firm and comprehensive counterinsurgency plan. The Maoists, 
therefore, reached Mao’s phase of strategic equilibrium, from which they could assert their 
demands strongly. Likewise, the political parties’ continuous failures to govern the state 
democratically allowed the Maoists to rise and invited the palace to step into politics. The 
monarchy’s draconian measures such as banning the political parties, however, created a 
platform for the Maoists and the political parties to form alliances to fight against the king 
while promoting the Maoists’ agenda. Thus, the Maoists were highly successful in 
capitalizing on the monarch’s mistakes and creating a space for their political participation 
in mainstream politics. Consequently, even though the government was partially successful 
in limiting and decreasing the Maoists’ capabilities and denied them any permanent base 
area, the Maoists worked politically with the banned political parties to legitimize their 
cause in the changed political setting. 
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Additionally, the Maoists’ internal factions and debate regarding their strategy and 
democratization process also forced them to seek a political solution instead of continuing 
an armed struggle for their cause. The Maoists were going through a continuous internal 
transformation, and they modified their strategy to accept the democratic agenda rather 
than continuing to push for a communist state after the political parties agreed to their 
republican demands. Thus, through a series of transformations and numerous agreements, 
the Maoists successfully ousted the king and finally became part of the body politic. 
That being said, international actors also played crucial roles in resolving the 
insurgency. While domestic factors were important in bringing the Maoists into the 
political arena, the global context of the War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States also played a significant role. The next chapter analyzes the international support for 
Nepal’s government and the international pressure on the Maoists to bring their insurgency 
to a peaceful end. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN 
THE MAOIST INSURGENCY 
The Maoist insurgency in Nepal, which lasted from 1996 to 2006, occurred in the 
broader international context of the fall of the Soviet Union and the international War on 
Terror. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world saw an increase in the 
adoption of the democratic process globally. The Maoists’ rise in Nepal posed a challenge 
to this world order, especially in South Asia. Strategically, Nepal lies between the rising 
powers communist China and democratic India, once again making Nepal a “yam” between 
the rocks of two powerful states. The Maoist insurgency threatened to change the political 
status quo in the region and thus prompted these powers to get involved in Nepal to pursue 
their various “strategic, political and economic interests.”186 In addition, the United States 
of America’s campaign against terror following 9/11 was another important international 
factor impacting Nepal’s Maoist insurgency, and Nepal’s government leveraged this 
campaign to secure its interests against the Maoists by declaring them terrorists.  
This chapter therefore analyzes the diplomatic and assistive roles of China, India, 
and the United States of America in supporting the government of Nepal and restricting 
the Maoists’ activities using their international platforms. This chapter examines how those 
international stakeholders mobilized their strategies, particularly focusing on India as the 
major power in the region. It finds that the Maoists’ entry into mainstream politics was a 
result of the continuous military and diplomatic pressures on the Maoists and the support 
provided to the Nepalese authorities. The key international actors played a vital role in 
bringing the Maoists to the negotiation table with the government, helping pave a way 
toward political participation and a peaceful solution.  
A. CHINA’S ROLE IN THE MAOIST INSURGENCY  
The Maoist insurgency had ideological connections to China. Still, this insurgency 
was based on Mao’s people’s war strategy and may have eventually brought Nepal closer 
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to the Chinese communist party, but there was no direct Chinese involvement in the Maoist 
insurgency as China refused to recognize the Maoists, calling them “anti-government 
forces.”187 The Chinese government therefore offered no support to the Maoists in Nepal, 
whereas the Maoists blamed the Chinese government for compromising Mao’s ideals and 
sought no support from China.188 Nevertheless, the perceived threat of Nepal’s potential 
alignment with China led other states, particularly India, to get involved in ways that 
ultimately drove the Maoists toward mainstream politics.  
China had historically seen Nepal as important to its security and political interests. 
After its annexation of Tibet in 1950, China considered its border with Nepal important to 
its security and rejected any global influence in Nepal against China.189 China’s 
engagement with Nepal since 1955 had been security-focused, based on using Nepal as a 
buffer against India. China used various policies, agreements, and regular assistance to 
maintain its relations with Nepal. Like India, China also maintained its relationship with 
Nepal through agreements such as the bilateral Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1960 and 
continued to focus on curbing what it saw as anti-Chinese activities by Tibetan refugees in 
Nepal, where more than 20,000 Tibetan refugees had made their homes.190 As Manish 
Dabhade and Harsh V. Pant argue, Chinese policy with respect to Nepal relied on 
promoting Nepal’s independence and neutrality to reduce Indian and Western influence, 
aiming to prohibit Western countries from using Nepal’s land against China. 
Continuing these principles of peaceful coexistence, in the name of regional 
stability, China cautiously maintained its supportive role before and during the insurgency 
for all the governments in Nepal. Indeed, China supported the Nepali government despite 
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international criticism of King Gyanendra’s 2005 royal coup. The Chinese government 
provided convoys of trucks supplying small arms and assured its continuous support to the 
royal regime even when all other countries halted their support to King Gyanendra.191 
After the start of U.S. involvement in Nepal through its military assistance to fight against 
the Maoists after 9/11, however, China labeled the Maoists “terrorists” and continued 
offering regular assistance to the governments of Nepal.192 As John Mage puts it, China 
did not want to “antagonize ... [the] U.S. regime,” 193 and so ostensibly supported the U.S. 
policy on combating terrorism. Hence, China’s role with respect to Nepal’s insurgency 
remained neutral despite its geographic proximity. 
Nevertheless, although, there is no evidence of any Chinese connection to the 
Maoist insurgency in Nepal, other states were worried that the communist ideology of the 
Maoists would give China greater influence in Nepalese politics. India in particular, which 
historically has supported the Nepali Congress Party, was worried that a Maoist victory 
could marginalize Indian influence and challenge the Indian security strategy. So, while 
China did not play a role in bringing the Maoists into mainstream politics, the perception 
that a Maoist victory would potentially empower China caused other actors to get involved 
in the conflict, and their actions ultimately drove the Maoists toward mainstream politics.  
B. INDIA’S ROLE IN THE MAOISTS’ PIVOT TO MAINSTREAM POLITICS  
India played a paramount role in the trajectory of Nepal’s Maoist insurgency due 
to its long history of influencing Nepal’s affairs and its perception that Nepal was vital for 
securing its interests. As Indian Diplomat S. D. Muni asserts, after the Chinese annexation 
of Tibet in 1950, the importance of Nepal to India became central when China started using 
Nepal’s land to the “disadvantage of India.”194 India interpreted any kind of Chinese 
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influence in Nepal as a threat to its national security due to its porous border with Nepal. 
India’s strategy with respect to Nepal during the period of the insurgency was led by its 
policy of securing India’s northern frontier, i.e., Nepal, against China and preventing the 
possible expansion of communist ideology in Nepal, which could align Nepal with China 
and could spill over into Indian territory. Yet, it was when King Gyanendra turned to China 
for military assistance after the international embargo on Nepal following his power grab 
that India adopted the strategy of bringing the Maoists and the Nepalese political parties 
together to fight against the monarch, which paved the way for the Maoists to enter 
mainstream politics.195 
India’s involvement in the Maoist insurgency occurred in the larger context of 
bilateral and strategic relations between India and Nepal. India considers Nepal’s 
mountainous region its defense frontier and emphasizes its strategic value.196 To confirm 
the role of Nepal in protecting Indian sovereignty, in 1950, India and Nepal signed the 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, clearly stating that both nations would not tolerate any 
foreign aggression against each other and must consult each other to “devise effective 
countermeasures.”197 India has also historically denied Nepal’s proposal to be considered 
a zone of peace, interpreting this proposal as an attempt to “extricate Nepal’s obligations 
to India” under the 1950 treaty.198 Similarly, through such treaties, India has compelled 
Nepal to remain within the Indian sphere of influence. Therefore, even before the 
insurgency, India and Nepal were bound, requiring consultation and mutual understanding 
on “defense-related matters”.199 
The Maoists’ insurgency in Nepal produced serious concerns in India due to their 
physical and political ties to Indian territory, especially their connections to left-wing 
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Indian extremist political parties, which India believed would inspire its growing Naxalite 
movements.200 The Maoist insurgency was thus of immense concern to India from the 
beginning, but it compelled India to adopt a serious course of action only after the 
escalation of disagreements between the Indian authorities and Nepal’s royal regime 
following the royal coup of 2005. Initially, India remained almost a silent observer and 
carried out regular diplomatic exchanges of views with Nepal on bilateral issues. India’s 
response to Nepal’s insurgency remained confused most of the time, as it applied a “two 
pillars”201 policy toward Nepalsupport for both the constitutional monarchy and the 
multiparty system, which were at odds with each other. The political parties and the 
Maoists criticized India’s support for the monarchy, as the monarchy was a main hindrance 
in the politics of Nepal.202 Nevertheless, India supported the Nepalese government’s effort 
to contain and eliminate the insurgency and so provided military assistance to the RNA to 
fight against the insurgency to limit the Maoists’ influence within Nepal. India asked Nepal 
to settle the insurgency internally, otherwise refraining from any direct involvement in the 
matter.  
While India urged the Maoists to resolve their grievances peacefully in the political 
arena, however, it did not stop the Maoists from using Indian territory for their activities, 
which was an attempt to moderate India’s influence in Nepal’s affairs.203 Indian border 
states like Bihar, West Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh provided the Maoists a safe place to 
recruit and conduct their activities. In those territories, the India-based People’s War Group 
and Maoist Coordination Centre provided armed training to the Maoists. The Maoists along 
with other extremist communist parties of India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh also 
established the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia 
and found Indian soil to be their sanctuary in the region since the start of the insurgency.204 
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As Rabindra Sharma, a famous journalist and a leader of Nepal’s Sajha party, put it, even 
though the Indian authorities continuously denied that they were supporting the Maoist 
movement, the Maoist leaders operated “without restriction” in the Indian capital, Delhi, 
and continued expressing their ideological views in major international media from Indian 
territory and received security from Indian intelligence services.205  
Indian policy towards Nepal’s insurgency long remained bifurcated, supporting 
Nepal’s government while allowing Nepal’s Maoists to use Indian land. Only after the 
Maoist insurgency reached the six-year mark did India label the Maoists a terrorist 
organization, in 2001, when the worldwide “War on Terror” broke out. The king, using the 
“War on Terror” campaign, was extending his authoritarian rule through the help of foreign 
military assistance in his fight against the insurgency, all in the name of combating 
terrorism. Still, during an international forum in Paris in 2002, in an effort to maintain its 
influence in Nepal, India continued to insist that other states not provide Nepal any 
extended support.206  
Yet the connection of Nepalese Maoists to Indian extremist organizations 
eventually forced India to act against the Maoists. As the Maoist insurgency dragged on 
and politics in Nepal deteriorated, the consequences for India’s internal security in states 
bordering Nepal further embroiled India in the conflict. From 2001 to 2005, 12 states out 
of 28 states in India were affected by left-wing extremism, and India suffered a huge loss—
669 deaths—to the Naxalite movement, which was a threatening alarm to the Indian 
security forces, as the Naxalites and the Maoists shared common tactics and 
inspirations.207 From a security point of view, India was thus compelled to treat the Maoist 
insurgency as a matter of international concern.  
Politically, Nepal–India relations were on edge at this point due to the 
unwillingness of the king to engage in India’s desired policy. When King Gyanendra took 
over executive power in 2005 and dismissed all the political parties, India was compelled 
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to review its approach to the Maoist insurgency. New Delhi feared the possible political 
crisis and threat generated by the royal coup, which it strictly condemned, declaring the 
suspension of military aid. King Gyanendra, instead of walking back his seizure of power, 
sought China’s support to curb the insurgency, and China, in response, was ready to help 
Nepal, citing that the insurgency was Nepal’s internal affair and Chinese support upheld 
continued bilateral cooperation. Diplomatically, India then started boycotting Nepal in 
international forums, refusing to attend the South Asian Association of Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) summit in February 2005, as it refused to share the stage with 
Nepal. In response, the king, during the SAARC summit in Dhaka in November 2005, 
proposed China as a new member of SAARC to counter Indian supremacy.  
King Gyanendra’s actions challenged the Indian regime and led to changes in 
India’s perspective on the monarchy and its adoption of a new course of action. As a result, 
after 2005, India adopted a strategy that would help bring the Maoists into mainstream 
politics: bringing the political parties and the Maoists together to fight against the 
monarchy.208 When the king received Chinese military support in contravention of treaties 
signed with India, India understood this action as a serious challenge by Nepal and was 
determined to oppose the king. India moved to mobilize the political parties of Nepal’s 
republican line and politically and diplomatically supported those parties in their alliance. 
After May 2005, India officially invited the Maoists and other political leaders to India to 
consult each other and to sign the 12-point agreement, which laid a foundation for the 
historic people’s movement of 2006, through which the Maoists formally entered 
mainstream politics.209 
In sum, India has historically attempted to assuage Chinese influence in Nepal for 
the sake of its own security concerns. The possible victory of the Maoists could have 
aligned Nepal with China, thereby endangering Indian security. However, it was the actions 
of the king that eventually posed a greater threat in that regard: when the king sought 
Chinese assistance against the treaty of 1950, India had to adopt a revised strategy to secure 
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its influence in Nepalhelping bring the Maoists and the political parties together against 
the monarch. This Indian strategy ultimately availed the Maoists an opportunity to enter 
into mainstream politics.  
C. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN FIGHTING AGAINST THE 
MAOISTS 
After 9/11, the United States became an ally and supporter of Nepal’s campaign 
against the Maoist insurgency that, from the beginning of the insurgency, provided various 
resources to Nepal. Like India, the United States supported the constitutional monarchy 
and multiparty democracy, seeking to maintain stability in Nepal.210 The U.S. policy 
objectives with respect to Nepal mainly focused on providing support for “democratic 
institutions and economic liberalization, promoting peace and security ... territorial 
integrity and alleviating poverty.”211 The United States believed that a military offensive 
could bring the Maoists to the negotiation table and supported Nepal through military 
assistance. The U.S. strategy of supplying military assistance subsequently helped drive 
the Maoists into mainstream politics and as did U.S. diplomatic opposition to the Maoists’ 
legitimacy; however, the Maoists joined mainstream politics despite the U.S. diplomatic 
opposition and military assistance. 
The Unites States had a clear policy in handling the Maoist insurgency: The Maoists 
were among the terrorist groups the United States was fighting against, so the United States 
viewed the Maoists as politically illegitimate. The United States mainly feared the 
expansion of radical communism in Nepal and understood the strategic value of Nepal, 
situated between the rising powers India and China.212 Strategically, the U.S. approach 
toward Nepal was largely based on its desire to stop the spread of Chinese influence in 
South Asia through Nepal. As such, another core interest of the United States was to stop 
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Nepal from collapsing and becoming a failed state, which could then be used by other states 
and non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.213 The officials of the U.S. embassy 
in Nepal stated that the United States did not want Nepal becoming a haven for any terror 
groups pursued by the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign. Since the United States was the 
closest ally of Nepal and encouraged Nepal to eliminate the Maoists, it did not want the 
Maoists to benefit politically in any way, and rejected any collaboration between the 
Nepalese government or political parties and the Maoists. Rather, the United States firmly 
believed in defeating the Maoists through counterinsurgency measures.  
The United States therefore provided various kinds of assistance to Nepal to 
enhance its fighting capabilities against the insurgency. After the escalation of the conflict 
in 2001, the United States supported Nepal as a part of its “War on Terror” campaign; as 
Winne Gobyn states, after 2002, several American military and diplomatic delegates 
visited Nepal, and the U.S. administration provided arms and ammunition, training, and 
equipment worth more than $29 million.214 Support of the U.S. military through 
sophisticated weaponry and training increased the strength of the Nepalese armed forces’ 
capabilities, which proved a challenge to the Maoist insurgents. Consequentially, the 
Maoists began losing battles and suffering significant losses. Moreover, taking the 
insurgency seriously, the U.S. administration placed the Maoists on a list of “Other 
Terrorist Groups” and froze the financial assets of the Maoists in the United States–
branding the Maoists as an illegitimate entity internationally.215 As a result, many states 
categorized the Maoists as terrorists, creating a crisis of legitimacy for the Maoists. In 
addition, the United States also supported the Nepalese effort to resolve its internal political 
crisis caused by underdevelopment and encouraged the Nepalese authorities through 
frequent high-level visits: the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, along with Christina 
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Rocca and many other high-level military officials, visited Nepal and assured their support 
against the Maoists, reinforcing Nepal’s campaign against the insurgency.216 
To counter the U.S. involvement in Nepal’s campaign against the insurgency, the 
Maoists tried to draw international attention to their cause by intensely criticizing the U.S. 
efforts in Nepal, frequently calling the United States an imperialist power. Accordingly, in 
an attempt to reframe the insurgency, Prachanda called the insurgency a war against 
imperial forces and called Nepal’s government a puppet of the United States.217 Still, 
Washington’s cooperation with India and the arrests of Maoist leaders in India further put 
the Maoists at a disadvantage, forcing the Maoists to change their headquarters from India 
to Nepal. Then, after Maoists killed two security guards at the U.S. embassy in Nepal and 
declared that they would take actions against any U.S.-funded agencies and their members, 
tension between the United States and the Maoists further increased.218  
Washington’s military and diplomatic support for Nepal’s government placed the 
Maoists in a vulnerable situation militarily and politically. Their avenues of international 
support for their cause diminished after the United States proclaimed diplomatic support 
for Nepal’s government. Because of this lack of international support, the Maoists 
acknowledged that even if they succeeded in creating a communist state, it would not be 
sustainable in the long run because it would be isolated from the international community. 
The Maoists’ leadership blamed the United States for obstructing their military progress 
and finally came to realize their inability to win over the state, essentially forcing the 
Maoists to reevaluate their strategy and pressuring them to pursue alternative means to 
achieve their objectives: joining mainstream politics.219  
At the same time, the United States’ opposition to the Maoists continued to be not 
only military but political, and when the Maoists pivoted from a military to a political 
strategy, the United States tried unsuccessfully to prevent them from joining mainstream 
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politics. When the king seized executive power in 2005, however, U.S. support to Nepal’s 
government came to a halt. The United States strongly demanded the assurance of 
democracy and guarantee of basic human rights as the conditions for continuing its support 
of the state.220 The king’s consolidation of power caused the United States to reevaluate 
its strategy in supporting Nepal, and Washington began to call for a democratic solution to 
the crisis. At the same time, as Bishnu Raj Upreti notes, the United States favored the 
monarch over a Maoist political victory and did not want the Maoists allied with other 
political parties against the monarchy. The U.S. diplomats in Nepal, therefore, tried to stop 
the collaboration between the SPA and the insurgents, including their signing the 12-point 
agreement.221 However, India’s strategy to bring the Maoists and the political parties 
together had advanced too far to stop, and the citizenry of Nepal wanted the Maoists to 
adopt peaceful politics; hence, the Maoists were able to form a coalition with the political 
parties and ended up joining the national polity.  
The U.S. effort to contain the Maoists from the beginning to the end of the 
insurgency was successful insofar as it compelled the Maoists to pursue a peaceful 
resolution and negotiate for political participation. At the same time, the United States also 
opposed the Maoists’ political participation in any form. Nevertheless, with the support of 
India and the population of Nepal, the Maoists were able to enter mainstream politics. 
D. CONCLUSION 
International involvement in Nepal’s insurgency was initially prompted by the fear 
of possible Chinese influence over Nepal and by the possible endangerment of India’s 
security. Further, U.S. involvement as Washington waged its global “War on Terror” 
campaign bolstered the fighting capacity of the Nepalese armed forces and compelled the 
Maoists to seek the alternative approach of a political solution to the conflict. The United 
States, however, continued to deny the political legitimacy of the Maoists and attempted to 
prevent their alliance with other political parties in Nepal due to their use of terror tactics 
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during the insurgency. The U.S. stance was largely checked by India’s influence in leading 
the Maoists into the political arena after the king tried to breach Nepal’s bilateral agreement 
with India. In the end, the political journey of the Maoists was a result of international 
support rendered to the government of Nepal and the resulting pressure against the Maoists. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Nepal’s Maoist insurgency, which started in February 1996 and ended in 2006, 
marked a significant political change in Nepal, producing a drastic shift in the country’s 
political structure. This radical group pursued its ideological goal of establishing a 
republican communist state and new people’s democracy largely through launching an 
insurgency. Nevertheless, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal ultimately provides an example 
of political settlement of radicalism due to the combined efforts of national and 
international actors. This case supports the logic of a holistic approach to conflict resolution 
that includes political and military approaches to bring insurgents off the battlefield and 
into the political arena.  
A. SUMMARIZING THE MAIN POINTS 
This thesis analyzes the Nepalese Maoists journey from an armed insurgent group 
to a legitimate political party that is now deeply engaged in the democratic process. This 
insurgency is described in the preceding chapters, which summarize the rise and fall of the 
Maoists, examine the successes of their strategies in partially achieving their objectives, 
and then analyze the factors that brought them into the democratic process. The failures 
and the successes of the relationship between the Nepalese state and the Maoists yield 
recommendations for policymakers. The recommendations offered here can help 
government leaders of developing states with social, political, and economic challenges 
similar to those of Nepal to politically and effectively counter insurgent movements and 
offer a path to peacefully settle ongoing or possible future insurgencies. In particular, these 
lessons and recommendations can help to address the reemerging Biplov Maoists, a splinter 
group of the previous Maoist group, now engaged in violent activities in Nepal.222 
The Maoist insurgency emerged out of various underlying economic, political, and 
social conditions that prevailed in Nepal, including widespread corruption, poverty, ill 
governance, social inequality, and many other factors. Being a agriculture-based economy 
 
222 Thomas A. Marks, “Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016,” Small Wars 
& Insurgencies 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 86, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1265820. 
74 
and with 88 percent of the population living in rural areas, the country’s diverse class 
structure and inequitable land distribution created extensive social and economic 
disparities. Economically, 40 percent of the population fell below the poverty line. At the 
outset of the insurgency, a majority of the people had little access to economic opportunity, 
as 12 percent of the population controlled 71 percent of the wealth.223 These chronic 
conditions of economic and social injustice led a majority of the population to harbor anti-
government sentiments. The Maoists successfully leveraged these sentiments to encourage 
violent political conflict and promised to redistribute the land, which ultimately served 
their ideological objectives. Thus, the poverty caused by landlessness, underdevelopment, 
inefficient government policies, and the unequal distribution of resources led the deprived 
people of Nepal to join the Maoist insurgency and fight for their cause.  
Another condition that favored the Maoists was ethnic grievances. In a country with 
more than 125 ethnic groups and more than 123 languages, the Maoists appealed to those 
divergent groups, clearing a path to make their demands political, promising them equality, 
and addressing their grievances through the formation of fronts for ethnic liberation that 
included the voices of those dissenting groups. In addition, political instability also fueled 
the insurgency since none of Nepal’s several successive governments during the 1990s 
implemented development plans and policies that could bring a fundamental change in the 
lives of the citizens. The ineffectual government, its corruption, and indifferent attitude 
toward socio-economic improvement, contributed to the rise of the Maoists, who were 
successful in capitalizing on these grievances and articulating the aspirations of the people. 
The state’s inability to effectively control the insurgency led the king to intervene 
in the nation’s political affairs by stepping into national politics in 2001. The rise of royal 
power during the insurgency turned Nepal’s politics toward authoritarian rule and resulted 
in the banning of the existing political parties. The monarch’s active interest in politics and 
gradual sidelining of the political parties worsened the situation by giving the Maoists 
momentum in their fight against the autocratic royal regime. The king eventually seized 
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executive power in 2005, which created a state of political crisis in the country, and this 
led to the formation of the alliance between the banned political parties and the Maoists, 
which led the Maoists to pursue their political journey. 
The international community, especially India and the United States, also played a 
vital role in the resolution of the Maoist insurgency. After the royal takeover, the 
international community strongly demanded the restoration of democracy and halted their 
military aid to Nepal, which posed a challenge to the royal regime. After the 9/11 terror 
attacks, India, the United States, and European countries labeled the Maoists a terrorist 
organization, creating a crisis of legitimacy for the Maoists. The political crisis in Nepal 
further deteriorated when the king sought help from China and adopted an anti-Indian 
policy in dealing with the Maoists. In the context of their shared exclusion from the political 
sphere, the formerly legitimate political parties and the Maoists, assisted by India, came 
together under a republican agenda to fight against the monarch. India played a major role 
in uniting the Maoists and other political parties in this campaign, which ousted the 240-
year-long monarchy through the historic people’s movement of 2006. So the Maoist’s entry 
into mainstream politics was also the result of the continuous effort of the international 
community. 
The eventual success of the Maoists’ insurgency was due to their well-planned 
strategy and timely modification of that strategy in due course of fighting. Throughout 
the insurgency, the Maoists proved a militarily and politically robust force, forcing the 
state to compromise and accede to at least some of the group’s demands. Militarily, the 
Maoists were able to compete with the state, and politically, the state’s continued 
inability to address the underlying issues of the insurgency gave the Maoists political 
leverage, and so they benefited from their alliance with the political parties, essentially 
opening the door for the Maoists to enter the political sphere and influence the legal 
political process. The Maoists had a clear vision and plan during their insurgency that 
gained them popular support; however, what ultimately made their movement successful 
was their ability and willingness to modify their strategy to achieve victory. The Maoists 
were successful in capitalizing on the changing political context after the royal takeover 
and realized their political objectives. 
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B. LESSONS LEARNED: FAILURES AND SUCCESSES OF THE MAOIST 
INSURGENCY 
The origins and political resolution of Nepal’s Maoist insurgency in the context of 
state response and international involvement offer some lessons about how to achieve a 
political resolution to an insurgency. These lessons, which could help Nepal and other 
countries in formulating policies to prevent armed insurrection, are described in the 
following paragraphs.  
First of all, excessive use of force against an insurgency during its initial stages 
tends to secure public support for the insurgents. This approach also escalates the conflict 
such that the insurgents are less willing to pursue political resolution. Any state that 
experiences an insurgency must be careful to handle the insurgency proportionally to avoid 
escalating the conflict, which may result from the use of severe repression and massive 
force against the rebelling party. When the Maoists declared their intent to adopt the path 
of armed insurgency in 1996, the government of Nepal tried to control the Maoists’ initial 
political campaign through brutal police operations, which eventually provided a stage for 
the Maoists to garner popular support and created a state of hatred against the regime 
among the population. The state suppression of the Maoists that followed resulted in 
massive destruction, death, rape, and arrests of the local population and pushed the people 
further into the Maoist fold. Simply put, when a state commits indiscriminate violence 
against its people, the insurgents benefit.224 As Adhikari and Samford put it, the discontent 
and hatred of the government created by state violence motivates people to take up arms 
against the state, and the popular support of the people for the Maoists supports this idea.225 
Thus, during the early stage of the insurgency, the proportionate use of force and pursuit 
of a political response is more likely to result in a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
Another important lesson from the case of the Nepalese Maoists is that if a state 
fails to address the political cause of the insurgency, it fails in countering the insurgency. 
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Grievances among the general population generated by state discrimination create support 
for the insurgents. People tend to mobilize against a state in which they have historically 
been marginalized and dominated by a minority group.226 The Nepalese people remained 
controlled by a small group of elites and experienced long-term political, economic, and 
social disparities, which created a favorable condition for the Maoists. The successive 
governments of the 1990s failed to acknowledge or address the deep-rooted causes of the 
populace’s discontent and adopted short-term and insufficient policies to counter the 
insurgency.  
That said, the case of the Maoists in Nepal also illustrates various successful 
approaches for the peaceful resolution of an insurgency. This case demonstrates that 
insurgencies can be addressed with strategically combined political and military measures. 
The government’s counterinsurgency measures limited the Maoists from achieving their 
objective to turn Nepal into communist state and forced them to reevaluate their strategies. 
In addition, although it did not address the root causes of the insurgency, the government’s 
continuous political determination to bring the Maoists to the negotiation table succeeded 
after a series of efforts that helped the Maoists to enter into mainstream politics. The 
political parties at first tried to control the Maoists by denying them access to the political 
system, but later they acknowledged the popularity of the Maoists’ republican agenda and 
were successful in convincing the Maoists to abandon violent tactics and pursue their 
demands within the democratic system. These events show that insurgencies can come to 
a peaceful end if the state adopts a combined political and military approach. 
Another lesson in successfully resolving an insurgency from the Nepalese Maoist 
case is that if a state is ready for political power sharing and adopts a policy of 
inclusiveness, insurgencies tend to settle peacefully. As Caroline A. Hartzell argues, civil 
wars end peacefully once the state guarantees to “a degree of representation within a 
governing institution,” and such representation can be achieved through electoral, 
administrative, and executive participation.227 The new government of Nepal eventually 
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accepted the main demands of the Maoists and guaranteed the proper representation of the 
marginalized community, restructured itself into a republican state, and abolished the 
monarchy, which created the conditions for the Maoists to join national politics. The 
willingness of Nepal to engage in a major constitutional amendment and Nepal’s readiness 
for structural change were successful in bringing the Maoists into mainstream politics. 
The final important lesson in success from Nepal’s counterinsurgency effort is that 
international involvement can help in bringing an armed insurgency to a peaceful end. 
Once an insurgency breaks out, it may not be limited to an internal matter of a state due to 
the globalized world order, and such conditions demand international involvement in an 
insurgency. The support of international communist organizations, especially in India, was 
ideologically crucial in driving the Maoists toward more hostile activities, and Indian 
territory was a sanctuary for their training and operational planning. For Nepal’s 
government, the role of India was equally important. Similarly, the United States, along 
with other countries, through their support for the government’s efforts to counter the 
insurgency pressured the Maoists to consider a political solution to the conflict, which 
finally led to the peace agreements that brought the Maoists from violence into the peaceful 
political mainstream. 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the findings of this research, Nepal needs to address the Biplov Maoist 
issue as soon as possible. Nepal needs to establish a clear and effective strategy while the 
insurgent group remains relatively small, as the longer it continues, the more likely it is 
that the state might need to engage militarily, which can be counterproductive. Once an 
insurgency breaks out, the use of force against the insurgents becomes compulsory. In that 
case, Nepal should be careful to use proportional force that will not escalate the conflict. It 
is important to consider that the initial use of force always carries a relatively high risk of 
being excessive, which favors the insurgents, who can leverage the government’s excessive 
use of force in garnering popular support. If a full-on armed insurgency emerges, the state 
could be obligated to use significant force against it, potentially worsening the situation. 
So, the sooner the state addresses the issue politically, the easier it will be to handle it. 
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With that goal in mind, the Biplov faction must be dealt with politically to prevent 
any further escalation of the conflict. This group advocates for the establishment of a 
communist state and is threatening to wage an armed insurrection. It is currently 
undergoing the preparatory phases of training and institutional buildup, which poses a 
serious threat to Nepal. So, Nepal should ensure that its demands are politically addressed 
and the situation remains under control. To that end, the issues raised by Biplov can be 
incorporated into the political process, where those Maoists can find a way to achieve their 
objectives peacefully. Nepal should provide them access to national politics and a share of 
the political power, so that they can pursue their agenda politically.  
In this effort, political parties and democratic conditions must be included. The state 
must adopt the democratic approach and hold the political parties accountable and 
responsible to negotiate with the rebel group. The conflict analyzed in this thesis escalated 
when the king banned the political parties and confronted the insurgency autocratically. By 
contrast, the political parties in Nepal are the main actors who convinced the Maoists to 
join the political process. The democratic system and the role of political parties in dealing 
with the insurgency provides an optimistic environment for peaceful resolution of the 
conflict. 
Internationally, Nepal should maintain harmonious relations with Indian authorities 
and concentrate on not allowing the Biplov group to use Indian territory as their sanctuary, 
which can deter them from waging armed conflict. Additionally, Nepal must make sure 
that India does not have incentives to side with the Biplov and leverage that relationship 
against the government of Nepal. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Maoist insurgency of Nepal was a political problem that ended 
after the state politically addressed the Maoists’ demands. The success of the Maoists’ 
strategy, the government’s approach toward the Maoists, and the involvement of the 
international community as a whole were significant in concluding the insurgency 
peacefully. The Maoists were adept at modifying their strategy after the national and 
international scenarios changed and the international community came together to fight 
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against terror activities throughout the world. The insurgents’ anticipation of international 
support vanished when India, the United States, and other countries imposed an embargo 
on them and they experienced a crisis of political legitimacy. As a result, the Maoists seized 
the opportunity to legitimize their cause by entering mainstream politics. This strategy 
modification rewarded the Maoists with an opportunity to align with other political parties 
in opposition to the royal regime. Thus, the Maoist insurgency and its peaceful solution 
was the result of combined national and international efforts, which settled a decade-long 





The 40-Point Demands 
1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, 
should be abrogated.  
2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January, 
1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the 
disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows an Indian imperialist monopoly 
over Nepal’s water resources. 
3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, 
controlled and systematized. All vehicles with Indian license plates 
should be banned from Nepal.  
4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centers should be closed. Nepali 
citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country.  
5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A ‘work 
permit’ system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are 
required in the country.  
6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and 
finance should be stopped. 
7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so 
that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant. 
8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. 
Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately. 
outlawed. 
9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs 
and INGOs should be stopped. 
10. A new constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the 
establishment of a people’s democratic system.  
11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be 
abolished. 
12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under 
people’s control. 
13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed. 
14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in 
Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kabhre, Sindhupalchowk. Sindhuli, 
Dhanusa, Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All 
false cases should be immediately withdrawn. 
15. The operation of armed police, repression and state-sponsored terror 
should be immediately stopped.  
16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared while in police custody at 
different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, 
Prabhakar Subedi and others, should be investigated and those 
responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly 
compensated. 
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17. All those killed during the People’s Movement should be declared 
martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed 
should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice.  
18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation. 
19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be 
stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property. 
20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic 
communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their 
own autonomous governments. 
21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be 
stopped. The system of untouchability should be eliminated. 
22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to 
prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels 
should be guaranteed. 
23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be 
guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely 
autonomous. 
24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and 
cultural workers should be guaranteed. 
25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the tarai should be 
eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural 
and urban areas should be treated at par. 
26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped. 
27. Land should belong to ‘tenants.’ Land under the control of the feudal 
system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the 
homeless. 
28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be 
confiscated and nationalized. Capital lying unproductive should be 
invested to promote industrialization. 
29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as 
employment can be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be 
provided. 
30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should 
be fixed and strictly implemented. 
31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be relocated until 
alternative infrastructure is guaranteed. 
32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by 
small farmers from the Agricultural Development Bank should be 
written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for 
small farmers. 
33. Fertilizer and seeds should be easily available and at a cheap rate. 
Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for 
their produce. 
34. People in flood and drought-affected areas should be provided with 
appropriate relief materials. 
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35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to 
all. The commercialization of education should be stopped. 
36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate 
to inflation. Essential goods should be cheaply and easily available to 
everyone. 
37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers. 
38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted. 
39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery, and the practices of 
middlemen and so on should be eliminated.  
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